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ABSTRACT

In the anti-semitic tract "On the Jewish Question," Karl
Marx constructs valid arguments and decries man's alienation

from society.

But he also uses stereotypes and innuendo to

distort readers' perceptions.

This study analyzes how both

rhetorically and linguistically Marx constructs his essay in
an attempt to persuade his audience to accept unquestioningly
his argument.

After an examination of the historical and

psychological background that produced Marx, this paper

investigates his use of figures of speech, the enthymeme,
informal fallacies, and hypothetical syllogisms to arouse

prejudice, pity and anger.

This thesis (borrowing from the

techniques of discourse analysis) also demonstrates

Marx's

use of the end-focus principle, segmentation, salience and

sequence to further his argument. And finally, by probing the
pragmatics of implicature, presupposition, and deliberate
ambiguity, this investigation uncovers Marx's implicit call
for genocide.
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But when a man's religion becomes really
frantic; when it is a positive torment to
him; and, in fine, makes this earth of
ours and uncomfortable inn to lodge in;
then I think it high time to take that
individual aside and argue the point with
him.

Herman Melville

INTRODUCTION

Do I hate my brother because he reminds
me of myself, or do I hate my brother
because he reminds me of someone who is

"not" myself?

Whom do I hate, the one

who is me, or the one who is anything but
me?

Elie Wiesel

Born in 1952, I thought I'd been liberally educated by
my parents. Raised agnostic during the McCarthy era, I often
had to counter charges of being a Communist for not attending
any house of worship. At eighteen, I found out that I was of
Jewish descent.

When I asked why this had been kept from me,

my father countered with,

"Your grandfather's parentage

didn't matter to him, so why should it matter to you?"

was it suddenly such a big deal to me?

Why

My question to him

was: if it wasn't a "big deal" why had no one ever mentioned
it?

Similarly, I had friends who were Mexican-American yet
raised not to be.

And, if they could speak Spanish, they

were cautioned not to use it outside of the family and they
were never, never to speak English with an accent.
In 1971 at UCLA, during the height of the Black Panther

movement and the establishment of the Black Students' Union

(BSU), my three black roommates were discriminated against—

not by the whites in the dormitory but by the blacks.

As

they refused to exchange me for an acceptable "sister"
roommate, they were labeled Uncle Toms and the four of us

spent our freshman year entering by the basement elevator
rather than confront the taunts of the "brothers" who

occupied the lobby in the main entrance.

Assimilation was everything then and if assimilation
wasn't possible, strident segregation was equally valid.

The

shadow of slavery, the Holocaust and MCCarthyism still

clouded minds and spirits.

Perhaps in reaction to all this,

I decided to leave the U.S. nhd make a new life in the
communal society of kibbutz in Israel.

Ten years later,

upon my return to America to complete my neglected formal
education^ it was with some shock and embarrassmeht that I
discovered Karl Marx, the father of communism, had written an

anti-Jewish tract'—^"Oh the Jewish Question

Tiie irohy was

overwhelming., while I was well aware he had said,
"Religion...is the opium of the people," I had never
considered that he, a Jew, might regard the Jews as anathema

and an obstacle to Communism because of their being Jews.

Amazingly, Marx's essay hasn't received much critical
attention.

One of the few who doesn't circumvent the issue

is Stephen Greenblatt who says, in Learning to Curse, "[Marx]

seize[d] upon the Jew as a kind of powerful rhetorical
device, a way of marshalling deep popular hatred and

clarifying its object" (41). Instead many, while referring to
some individuals' racist anti-Semitic interpretations,

sidestep these connotations and, like Shlomo AVineri,
conclude that though it presents "a rather unflattering image
of Judaism [this] somehow overshadows the question about
[Marx's] actual attitude which caused the essay to be
written, i.e., the position of the Jews in Prussia" (448).

My study attempts to unite an historical overview of the
time and place in which Marx was writing with philosophical
and psychological understahdings of hate and
anti-Semitism—as they specifically relate to Marx—and

examine how both rhetorically and linguistically Marx
constructs his essay in an attempt to persuade his audience
to accept unquestioningly his argument.

Marx's essay includes numerous, blatantly anti-Jewish

remarks but the basis for them is hard to pin down; his antiSemitism is puzzling.

Hopefully, this study will illuminate

the enigma.
As I have worked from an English trahslation of Marx's

original German, a note with regard to this choice is in

order.

Robert Tucker, the editor and translator of the

particular text ("On the Jewish Question") I have used says
in his "Notes on Texts and Terminology,"

"Translators of

Marx from German into other languages have had to resolve

some special problems, arising in part from Marx's use of
Hegelian philosophical terminology."

This, while a problem

for the translator trying to determine whether "alienation"
or "estrangement" is the best English equivalent for Marx's
use of entfremdung, did not present difficulties in my
particular rhetorical-linguistic analysis.

There are those

who have asked how I can apply the end-focus principle, the

principle of climax, etc. when dealing with the work in

translation.

To this I reply, the analysis was performed on

the translation, and its merit, as such, must be left to the
reader to determine.

CHAPTER ONE

MARX'S MILIEU

A philosopher of imposing stature doesn't
think in a vacuum. Even his most
abstract ideas are, to some extent,

conditioned by what is or is not known in
the time when he lives.

Alfred North Whitehead

Karl Marx promulgated human emancipation, most notably
in his well-known works, the Communist Manifesto (1848) and

the much later Capital (1867-95).

But years earlier, in "On

the Jewish Question" (1844), he laid the groundwork for his
vision for the future of mankind.

In doing so he needed a

culprit responsible for the way things were at the time.

He

seize[d] upon the Jew as a kind of powerful rhetorical
device, a way of marshalling deep popular hatred and
clarifying its object. The Jew is charged not with
racial deviance or religious impiety but with economic
and social crime, crime that is committed not only
against the dominant Christian society but, in less
'pure' form, by that society. (Greenblatt 41)
In the first part of "On the Jewish Question," written

in response to two essays by Bruno Bauer--"The Jewish
Question" (1842) and "The Capacity of the Present-day Jews

and Christians to Become Free,"(1842)^-^Marx

criticizes

politics to make the case that political man is divided, torn

between two constraints of his own making:
his civil society and to his state.

his adherence to

Civil society was

further complicated by man's religion.

In a religious state,

Marx believed mankind to be the furthest from realizing his
emancipation.

However, in those countries, like the United

States, which had succeeded in abolishing a state religion,

he saw man as "politically emancipated from religion [which]

is not to be finally and completely emancipated from
religion, because political emancipation is not the final and
absolute form of human emancipation" ("Question" 32).

The

reason for his non-acceptance of political emancipation as

true human emancipation was simple; the state could consider
itself free without the individual being free, in that
religion would be relegated to the realm of the civil society

and worship by the individual.
separation and egoism.

It was still a form of

He concluded that the "question of

the relation between political emancipation and religion

becomes for us a question of the relation between political

emancipation and human emancipation" ("Question" 31).
Marx

disputes Bauer's contention that the state can be

emancipated while the individual is free to practice religion
privately. As one of the so-called "rights of man," that

contention, Marx says, serves only to promote self-interest,
further separating man and state-—putting the state at the
disposal of man. He concludes that "human emancipation
requires the ending of the division between man as an

egoistic being in 'civil society' and man as abstract citizen
in the state." ("Question" 26). In the Second part of the

essay he criticizes economics/commerce which he equates with
Judaism, thereby making the case that society must be
emancipated from Judaism.

Stephen Greenblatt points out that Karl Marx wisely
sidesteps the issue of race in his essay, but it is worth our
time to consider why Marx should choose to overlook this

commonly preferred basis for promoting prejudice.
Race is something that mankind has used as a measurement
of quality.

There are those who contend that certain races

are superior to others.

They base this opinion oh certain

distinctions and characteristics such as relative

intelligence, cranial capacity, eye color and shape, skin

pigmentation, brow ridges, zygomatic arch placement, jaw
structure, stature, etc.

A belief that certain bloodlines

are "purer" or better than others has allowed people to
relegate others to distinct classes. Yet wars, such as the

French Revolution—a "class struggle," have never settled the
race issue nor the theories surrounding them.

But race as a biological construct did not emerge until
the 1860s and 1870s, quite some time after Marx wrote "On the

Jewish Question." So, because he knew very little about race
he did not avoid the issue# but rather did not address it at
all.

Religion is another issue that we humans use to qualify
individuals. If we use Webster's secular definition we can

say that religion is a "cause, principle, or system of
beliefs held to with ardor and faith."

The Jews have the

dubious distinction of having the word, "Jew" used to define
both their religion and race.

In The Oxford English Dictionary, the word "Jew" is
defined as "A person of Hebrew descent; one whose religion is

Judaism; an Israelite."

It goes on to say that originally

the Jew was considered to be:

a Hebrew of the kingdom of Judah, as opposed to those
of the ten tribes of Israel; later, an Israelite who

adhered to the worship of Jehovah as conducted at
Jerusalem.

Applied comparatively rarely to the

ancient nation before the exile but the commonest name

for contemporary or modern representatives of this
group, now spread throughout the world. The word
"Jew" is also applied to groups, e.g. the Falashas in
Ethiopia, not ethnically related to persons of the
main European groups, the Ashkenazim and the
Sephardim. ("Jew," OED 228)

Though Marx deals with reiigion in this essay it is with
a jaundiced eye.

In the introduction to the "Contribution to

the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'," published a

■
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year later, he writes "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed
creature, the sentiment Of a heartless world, and the soul of

soulless conditions.

It is the opium of the people" (54).

Marx holds no religion in high regard. Instead he writes in

"On the Jewish Question" of the nature of things.

"The

Christian State, by its very nature, is incapable of

emancipating the Jew" ("Question" 27).2 m paraphrasing
Bruno Bauer, Marx says, "the Jew, by his very nature cannot
be emancipated" (27). Again, citing Bauer, he writes, "'...he
is and remains a Jew, even though he is a citizen and as
such lives in a universal human condition; his restricted

Jewish nature always finally triumphs over his human and
political obligations'" (28).And still relying on Bauer to
help construct his own argument, Marx quotes him saying,
"'[The Jew] declares, by this separation, that the particular

nature which makes him Jewish is his true and supreme nature,

before which human nature has to efface itself" (40).
Like race, an exact definition of human nature is

problematic.

"The Greeks--most notably Plato and Aristotle-

introduced the notion of form, nature or essence as an

explanatory, metaphysical concept" ("Philos. Anthro.," Brit.
559). This kind of thinking was used to explain how animal
and plant species gave rise to like kind and could not be
interbred. Man, setting himself apart from the flora and
■
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fauna by virtue of his intelligence, reason, use of tools,

and language, saw his nature as iiranutable--determined by his
place in the universe and destiny—-until the 15th century.
Certain Renaissance humanists declared, on the other hand

however, that man could take responsibility for his own
actions; in addition to his own nature, he had free will.

Further, during the 17th and 18th century Enlightenment, some

argued that man could develop morally and materially by using
reason. In the 19th century, with an emphasis on science,

other new disciplines arose; religion's influence began to
decline.

An organic perception of man and nature was now

emphasized; man was no longer viewed outside nature but

within it.

A fixed human nature was rejected while "[t]here

was a continued commitment to the perspective for the
individual, and his creative relation with the world"

("Philos. Anthro.," Brit. 566). Marx, a Romantic humanist,

held to this tenet coupled with the scientific application of
reason.

In "On the Jewish Question,"

where Marx first decries

religion's negative impact on society, he uses the Jew as the
focal point for blame, epitomizing capitalism and the culprit

for man's alienation from himself as a species-being.^

As we

have seen, he says the Jew elevates his nature above that of
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humanity, "... his restricted Jewish nature always finally
triumphs over his human and political obligations," thus
setting himself apart. Judaism is equated with capitalism

where "[m]oney is the jealous god of Israel" ("Question" 50).
The Jew is the "huckster," worshipper of Mammon, the egoist
whose "profane basis" is "practical need" and "self

interest." "The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the
nationality of the trader, and above all of the financier"

(51).

For Marx, Judaism is not merely a religion; Jews are,

by nature, capitalists, the bourgeoisie.

Therefore, it will

never be enough for the Jew to renounce his religion--he can
not.

The Jew is his religion--the religion the Jew.

According to Marx the inherent nature of the Jew is Judaism.

This will forever ban him from the final Marxian nation where

there is no need for rule of man over man, no private
property, no class relations.

Property relations will be

abolished; there will be no exclusive relationships, no
jealousy, greed or crime as these are all products qf class
relations.

Jew.

The only barrier to realizing this Utopia is the

How is this to be actualized?

Marx says, "In the final

analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of
mankind from Judaism" (49).

"The social emancipation of the

Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism" (52).
How do we explain this virulent attack? We can ascribe
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it to prejudice, but that may be an oversimplification.

Gordon Allport, a leading contributor to the analysis of

prejudice, cites a wit as defining prejudice as "being down
on something you're not up on" (8). which is another way of
saying, "prejudice is: thinking ill of others without

sufficient warrant."'^ [Allport's emphases] while recognizing
that prejudice can also carry positive connotations, Allport

points out that with regard to ethnicity,^ prejudice is
generally conceived of as negative. He breaks down the
definition further by saying:
The phrase "thinking ill of others" is obviously an
elliptical expression that must be understood to

include feelings of scorn or dislike, of fear and
aversion, as well as various forms of antipathetic

conduct;

such as talking against people,

discriminating against them, or attacking them with
violence. (7)
This helps to define the term, but what of its source?

It is a serious error to ascribe prejudice and
discrimination to any single taproot, reaching into
economic exploitation, social structure, the mores,
fear, aggression, sex conflict, or any other favored
soil. Prejudice and discriminatidn... may draw
nourishment from all these conditions and many others.
(Allport, Preface xii)
Since some people have no definable reason for their bigotry,
reason will never persuade them that it is unjustified.

They

are also just as likely to dislike a group of people that
they have never encountered as one they have. As Leonard

Dinnerstein, author of Antisemitism in America, said in an
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online Voice of America interview:

I think certain things have been drilled into children
from childhood, such as the Jews killed Christ, there
are some stereotypes that are so deeply embedded in

the culture that I don't know when they will go away.
I hope eventually but I can't predict absolutely.
Karl Marx's prejudice took the form of anti-Semitism which

"simply means hostility towards Jews," as defined by
Dinnerstein,

[hjostility in thought or deed. Thoughts are
impossible to measure so it has to be hostility in

expressions or activities. We find that anti-Semitism
is just another example of hostility towards the
outgroup. (VGA Interview)
which brings us to the paradox: if you hate them, and the
"them" is like you, whom do you hate?
It is doubtful that we can wholly explain why Marx
thought the way he did.

That his argument springs from

deepseated, numerous elements that he, himself, could not
verbalize is likely.

Race and religion are issues that spawn

prejudice and have served as catalysts for segregation,
warfare and annihilation.

To understand the venom of Karl

Marx's rhetoric, it is nedessary to acquaint oneself with the
psychologic ramifications of having been born Jewish in 19th
century Germany and the Jewish self-hatred this could have

engendered. What is more, his philosophic and historic
legacies cannot be overlooked. All are intricately interwoven
to create that entity that was Karl Marx.
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Jewish history is filled with pogroms and anti-Semitic

purges.

Here and there it is also dotted with periods of

relative calm and at times Jews were even accepted by their
non-Jewish neighbors in the Diaspora.
On September 28, 1791, two years after the French

revolution and two years after legislators di^ew up the
preface to the French Constitution proclaiming the equality

of men, the General Assembly delegates, pressured by the
members of the Paris Commune, granted Jews full rights of
French citizenship.
In 1799 Napoleon rose to power. In a series Of political
moves that proved expedient to his burgeoning empire, he
courted and wooed the Jews.

On September 3, 1806 he asked

them to create and convene a Sanhedrin--the Supreme Court of
the Jews—-defunct since the destruction of the Second Temple

in 70 C.E..

Playing upon his beneficent mien, as perceived

by the French Jews, Napoleon courted their influence with
their eastern brethren in Poland to provision his troops
there. In 1808, he declared Judaism an "official" religion of
France; the rabbis' salaries were set by the state and they

were regulated by "consistories," departmental associations
of Jewish laymen (Sachar 64)>

So while the Jews were

accorded a modicum of recognition and freedom, they were now
state regulated.

'l4;;

Following his takeover of the continent. Napoleon set
about instituting formal constitutions after the French model
in each of the states.

This boded well for the Jews of the

former Holy Roman Empire who, since 1792, had petitioned
their monarchs for equal rights.

In the German states,

however, each Jewish petition was countered by a petition by
German citizens, "urging authorities to keep the Jews in
their ghettos" (Sachar 66).
Nonetheless, ghettos in the the German states were

destroyed and their inhabitants freed.
Prussia,

In

unoccupied

Jewish emancipation did not occur until 1812, and

then it was only partial as they could not hold state

offices. Prussian Jews were still viewed with suspicion
despite their having taken part in military action against
the French,

many distinguishing themselves in action—even

receiving the Iron Cross (Sachar 68).
Following Napoleon's Waterloo, conservatism seized

Europe with the populace embracing a return to the preNapoleonic period. In Italy, Austria, Hungary and Galicia
Jews were once again relegated to ghettos.

They were

harassed, had special taxes imposed upon them, and were

forced to take humiliating oaths in law courts. In Germany—
both in Prussia and the former Confederatioh of the Rhine—

15

Jews were even more greatly oppressed.

Immanuel Fichte and Georg Hegel, preaching what became
known as romantic conservatism,

"deduced from the past that

the welfare of the State-Leviathan took precedence over the

happiness of individuals" (Sachar 102).

To put oneself and

one's needs before the state's was tantamount to treason.
Between 1815 and 1840 there was a radical return to

nationalism in the German states and with it came renewed
hatred of the Jews.

Frederich Riihs of the University of Berlin and Wilhelm

Ries of the University of Heidelberg offered anti-Semitism an

intellectual rationale.

They viewed the Jewish minority as a

"'state within a state," as a "menace to the welfare and

character of the Germans'" (qtd.in Sachar 103).
Further complicating the period was the public's growing
fascination with science. Scientists "chose to assume that

matter was the source of everything in the universe,

including life and consciousness.

Everything else was either

an illusion or else a subjective impression which could be
'reduced' to material fact" (Barzun, DMW 9).

Scholars

hastened to ground everything in fact.
Arising within this historical milieu was Karl Herschel

Marx.

His father, Herschel ha-Levi Marx, was a successful

Jewish lawyer who "came from a long line of distinguished
■ .

' .1^6'

rabbis" (Kamenka xiii).

After studying jurisprudence and

becoming an "enlightened Deist and liberal Kantian" (Kamenka
xiii), though formally remaining a Jew, Herschel returned to
Trier where his father and elder brother were rabbis. In a

Jewish ceremony, Herschel Marx married Henriette Pressborck,

the "daughter of a rabbi from Nijmegen in Holland, whose
ancestors had been rabbis in Hungary" (Kamenka xiii).

Of the

nine children born to them only Karl and five sisters
survived.

Karl was born on May 5, 1818 in Trier, located in a

province of the Rhine "liberated" by the Prussians from

France. Sometime between 1816 and 1817, Karl's father was
baptized into the Evangelical established church of

the kingdom of Prussia...seven years later, on 24
August 1824, Karl Marx [age 6](with his five sisters)
stood at the baptismal font. In 1825,; after both her
parents had died, Marx's mother finally went through

the ceremony of baptism. (Kamenka xiii-xiv)
While some biographers have suggested that this

conversion was due to the elder Marx's Deist/Enlightenment
convictions, more recent study has shown that Prussian

legislation forced Herschel to choose between his law
practice as State Legal Counsellor in Trier, and remaining a
Jew (Kamenka xiv). In 1815, Herschel Marx wrote to the
Governor-General requesting that the laws applying solely to
Jews be annulled, identifying himself as a believer and
member of the Jewish coiranunity.
17

In 1816 the President of the provincial Supreme Court
interviewed Heinrich [Herschel] Marx and recommended
that he and two Other Jewish officials be retained in

their posts and that the King grant them the special
exception....The Prussian Minister of Justice failed
to recommend such an exception. (Kamenkaxiv)

No evidence exists indicating the extent of Jewishness
in Herschel Marx's household and many researchers refute
those who suggest that the elder Marx was anti-Semitic. Much

writing and correspondence exists though, showing Karl Marx's
vehement and hostile attitude toward Jews and Judaism.

Marx

viewed Ferdinand Iiassalle® (a fervent anti-Semite, though
Jewish himself, and a socialist who became Marx's opponent
within the revolutionary movement) as the "'most unGreek of
all the water-pollack Jews/' He is 'Itzig.' His books stink

of garlic.
(206).

But mainly

he is that 'Jewish Nigger, Lassalle'"

In a letter to Friedrich Engels, Marx continues his

"impression of the external nature of the Jew as typified by
Lassalle";

Always this constant babble with the falsely excited
voice, the unaesthetic, demonstrative gestures, the

didactic tone...And also the uncultivated eating and
the horny lust of this "idealist."

It is now

completely clear to me that, as his skull shape and
hair prove, he is a descendant of those Blacks who
accompanied Moses on the exodus from Egypt. (If his
mother or grandmother on his father's side did cross
with a nigger.) Now this combination of Jewishness
and Germanness upon the Black basic substance must
bring forth a strange product. (Gilman 206)

That Marx, who was dark complected and nicknamed "Moor,"
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(Kamenka 345) should disparage Lassalle on the basis of his
heritage and color is ironic and yet in keeping with Marx's
penchant for denigrating in others what was inherent in
himself.

This form of diatribe is also reflected in "On the

Jewish Question" where Marx poses rhetorical questions

regarding Judaism and Jews and then supplies the answers,
"What is the profane basis Of Judaism?
self-interest.

Huckstering.

Practical need,

Vlhat is the worldly cult of the Jew?

What is his worldly god?

Money" (48).

At the same time there appears a strong ambivalence in
Marx when we compare his actions to his words,

in 1871

Mikhail Bakunin^ writes of Marx, praising his intelligence
and work as a scholar, especially in economics, and his love

for the cause of the proletariat. He lauds Marx for being the

"chief inspirer" of the founding of the International.^

But

then he points out what he views as Marx's faultss
Marx is extremely vain, a vanity which causes him to
descend to filth and madness. This is strange in so

intelligent and honestly devoted a man and can only be
explained by his education as a German scholar and a
man of letters and particularly by his nervous Jewish
character....Himself a Jew, he has surrounded himself

in London and France but above all in Germany, with
crowds of minor, more or less clever, scheming, glib,
speculating Jews. Like Jews everywhere else, they are

banking or commercial a.gents, literary people,
political people, correspondents for newspapers of all

shades..!.(Bakunin 117-19)
Bakunin's own prejudices notwithstanding, we see Marx as a
•
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man who, on the one hand, vilifies Jews while, on the other,

surrounds himself with them.

The man was an enigma, and it

would not be too far fetched to assume he was tormented. As

David McLellan puts it in his introduction to Karl Marx;
Interviews and Recollections;

The whole frsunework of Marx's existence was penetrated
by profound structural contradictions. He was a Jew
living in a Christian culture. He was a German living
in London. He was a socialist living in a bourgeois
society, (xii)
Eugene Kamenka confirms McLellan's conclusions and moves into

the realm of psychology when he states in his introduction to
The Portable Karl Marx;

[I]n Marx's childhood Character, in his sharp tongue,
strong cimbition, and frequent aloofness —
characteristics that stayed with him for much of his
life--we do find some evidence of an underlying
insecurity and distress, so frequently linked with
equivocal status, (xiv-xv)
We can readily see this "equivocal status" made manifest

by the conversions to Christianity in Marx's household.

By

Jewish rabbinic law, if one is born to a Jewish mother, one

is Jewish, regardless of later conversions by either the
mother or her offspring. The Evangelical Church, however,

would view the Marx family as Christian.

Jews in Prussia had

the option declaring allegiance to their religion or they
could adapt to their surroundings.

Herschel Marx's forlorn

attempt to remain faithful to his religion and heritage
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illustrates that the alternative to adaptation was not

promising.

The Marx family was not unique.

Many Jews, with

the advent of the Enlightenment and emancipation, moved to

the cities where they did not have to bear close scrutiny by
Orthodox Jews.

Also, by this time, central-European Judaism

had become rigid.

The new, secular Western culture was

seductive. The Jews "were willing to go to almost any length
to prove themselves worthy of citizenship, even, in the case

of some, if it meant sacrificing their religious
identification" (Sachar 140).
What arose from this "psychic insecurity" was Jewish
self-hatred. In an attempt to move into the Prussian drawing
rooms of the aristocrats and intelligentsia and have them, in
turn, as guests, Jews began to struggle against that which

they saw as an obstacle to full acceptance by Prussian
society—their Jewishness. As Moritz Goldstein wrote in 1912
in the journal Per Kunstwart "We Jews administer the

intellectual property of a people which denies us the right
and the ability to do so" (qtd. in Arendt 30).
Howard Morley Sachar relates the dilemma of Rahel Levin

a "brilliant salon Jewess." She entertained the most original

minds in Germany at the time in her home.

She had a unique

ability to discern new talent, being the first "to introduce
Goethe and Ranke to the literary world."
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She was called,

"the most gifted woman of the universe, a seeress With the
influence of a Pythia, the first modern woman of German
culture" (14X).

She was, however, desperately unhappy due

to, as she viewed it, the misfortune of having been born
Jewish. In writing to a friend she sayss
How loathsomely degrading, how offensive, insane and
low are my surroundings, which I cannot avoid. One
single defilement, a mere contact, sullies me and
disturbs my nobility. I imagine that just as I was
being thrust into this world a supernatural being
plunged a dagger into my heart with these words: "Now,
have feeling; see the world as only a few can see it,
be great and noble...But with one reservation: be a
Jewess!" (qtd. in Sachar 141).
In 1814, after marrying a thirty-year-old Christian writer

and diplomat (thirteen years her junior), she was baptized a
Lutheran the same day (Sachar 141).

while some Jews fled their heritage by conversions,
others did not seek salvation in such maneuvers.

They, like

Moritz Goldstein, Franz Kafka and Walter Benjamin born more

than two generations later,

preferred instead to forge

ahead, "to discover new ways of dealing with the past"

(Arehdt 38)
not because they believed in "progress" and an
automatic disappearance of anti-Semitism or because
they were too "assimilated" and too alienated from

their Jewish heritage, but because all traditions and
cultures as well as all "belonging" had become equally
questionable to them. (Arendt 36).

We can see vestiges of this dilemma and Rahel Levin's
self-loathing in Marx, himself, in his 1841 poem (written two
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years before "On the Jewish Question") in a Berlin literary
magazine, Athenaeum.
The Player

The player strikes up on his violin,
His blond hair falling down.
He wears a sword at his side.

And a wide, wrinkled gown.

"0 Player, why playest thou so wild?
Why the savage look in thine eyes?

Why the leaping blood, the soaring waves?
Why tearest thou thy bow to shreds?"

"I play for the sake of the thundering sea
Crashing against the walls of the cliffs.
That my eyes be blinded and my heart burst
And my soul resound in the depths Of Hell."
"0 player,why tearest thou thy heart to shreds
In mockery? This art was given thee
By shining God to elevate the mind
Into the swelling music of the starry dance."

"Look now, my blood-dark sword shall stab
Unerringly within thy soul.
God neither knows nor honors art.

The hellish vapors rise and fill the brain.
Till I go mad and my heart is utterly changed.
See this sword—the Prince of Darkness sold it to me.

For he beats the time and gives the signs.
Ever more boldly I play the dance of death.

I must play darkly, i must play lightly.
Until my heart and my violin burst."
The player strikes up on his violin.
His blond hair falling down.
He wears a sword at his side.

And a wide, wrinkled gown. (Payne 59-60)
The title itself Can be interpreted as an equivocation.
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It can mean the player of a musical instrument, in this case,

the violin; it can be construed also as one who is acting or
playing a role; a player can also be someone involved in a

game. Which of these players is Marx?

The God-given art that

the speaker refers to "to elevate the mind"

but which the

player uses instead "to tear [his own] heart to shreds in

mockery" may be Marx's own writing and his venomous, caustic

ability with words, which he then uses to "stab unerringly
with [the] soul" of his interlocutor, while at the same time,
he destroys himself.

Goethe was one of Marx's favorite poets (see Appendix
'A'), so it is not difficult to connect the allusion to the
player's purchase of the sword from the Prince of Darkness to

the pact in Faust.

In the poem, we can only guess as to the roots of the
protagonist's tortured self-hatred.

As for Marx, himself, it

seems that his race, his religion, his Jewish origins may
explain much in his writing and his conflicted personality.

Gerhart Saenger writes in his 1953 book The Social Psychology
of Prejudice that many Jews, having resisted suppression for
generations, resign themselves to accepting prejudice. Those

Jews who still resist are viewed by the resigned, as
troublemakers.

It is better, in the resigned's view, to
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avoid bringing anti-Seiaitism to public awareness.

Furthermore, they believe that anti-Semitism is brought on by
the behavior of those troublesome Jews; if all Jews behaved
as they, themselves, did, anti-Semitism would cease to exist.

The "bad" Jews are responsible for the "good" Jews not being
accepted by the majority.

The "good" Jews now feel that they

have more in common with the majority by sharing the majority

prejudice.
Jews.

The "good" Jew now feels superior to the other

From a psychological standpoint, this allows him an

outlet for his aggression "resulting from discrimination as
well as from his inability to escape the situation due to his

resignation but also additional support for his self-esteem"
(Saenger 30).

Saenger goes on to point out the devastating

consequences of this self-hating pattern:

From here it is only one step toward releasing the
accumulated hostility toward members of one's own
group or other minorities. Jews become anti-

Semites...The price, however, which the minority
member pays for such neurotic outlet is the inability
to identify with his own group. Rejected by the
majority and by the minority such individuals are
often quite isolated. (30-31)
Saenger recommends that instead of becoming resigned to the

discrimination that the individual take overt action against
the prejudice—even to the point of militant action.

This

produces a better adjusted individual (31).
In Jewish Self-Hatred, Sander Oilman explains why this

strategy is not only the best of two options but probably the
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only practical solution.

He contends that as the minority

member attempts to adapt to the majority/

the majority

views his actions as "The more you are like me/ the more I
know the true value of my power, which you wish to share, and

the more I am aware that your are but a shoddy counterfeit,
and outsider" (2).

It is an ever moving target, an

unachievable goal.
The power rests with the determining majority. "One
cannot escape these labels [ethnic, religious or class

identity] because of the privileged group's myth that these
categories are immutable" (Oilman 4). if one is to circumvent
the "power," one must change the rules.

Myths cannot be

eradicated; they must be supplanted. One must create a new
myth.

Marx tried.

By attacking religion:—"the opium of the

masses"—he attempted to change the myth.

Unfortunately, to

do so, he had to demonize his origins.
I must play darkly, I must play lightly.
Until my heart and my violin burst.
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CHAPTER TWO

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS:

FORMS, FALLACIES AND FIGURES

What's in a name? That which we call a
^ , rose ■

■

By any other name would smell as sweet.
William Shakespeare

In the classical tradition rhetoric meant "the art of

persuasive speaking."

Rhetoric originated 2,400 years ago in

the courts of Syracuse in arguments over property, and it is

ironically fitting that Karl Marx should use rhetoric to

propound his doctrine advocating the freeing of humans from
their dependence upon property.

Later, rhetoric Came to

encompass written disGourse as well and has since undergone

changes along with a deepening understanding of human nature
and language. Developments in history, culture, psychology,

literature, and philosophy have also served to shape modern

rhetorical strategies and study.

However, three types of

appeals, first identified by Aristotle, have remained
indispensable to modern rhetoricians: logos, ethos and

pathos. Of these respective appeals Aristotle said.
The man who is to be in command of them must, it is
clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to

, ■ ■ 27

understand human character and goodness in their
various forms, and (3) to understand the emotidns-
that is, to name and describe them, to know their
causes and the way in which they are
excited.(Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, 154)

While the classical rhetoricians may have disapproved of the
emphasis upon pathos, and many, like Plato, despised

rhetoric, preferring the dialectic with its emphasis on

logos, pathos' power to sway people cannot be denied.
Kenneth Burke says, in "Rhetoric-^Old and New," that

modern rhetoric hinges upon the principle of "identifi
cation," which, though a deliberate device like the

persuasion of "old" rhetoric, "can include a partially
/unconscious' factor in appeal" (63).

He elaborates further

on this concept by saying,
identification can also be an end, as when people

earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group
or other. Here they are not necessarily being acted
upon by a conscious external agent, but n\ay be acting
upon themselves to this end. In such identification
there is a partially dreamlike, idealistic motive,
somewhat Compensatory to real differences or divisions
which the rhetoric of identification would transcend.

("Rhetoric--Old and New" 63)
Identification, therefore, is the process by Which speakers
get themselves accepted by an audience.

That audience, in

turn, suspends its logic (in the Aristotelean sense) to
follow along. The new rhetoric exploits this.
Roland Barthes, another modern rhetorician, includes

"ludic" as one of his six practices in rhetoric.^ He defines
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it as a mockery of rhetoric that developed naturally in
response to the repressiveness of rhetoric's institutiohal

system. It is, he continues,

a "black" rhetoric (suspicions, contempt, ironies):
games, parodies, erotic or obscene allusions,

classroom jokes, a whole schoolboy practice (which
remains to be explored moreover, and to be constituted
as a cultural code). (Barthes 14)
Ludic is a cognate for "play," and play's derivation is
readily apparent in that both it and ludic are defined as

opposition to work, irony, parody.

This multi-faceted concept of "ludic/play," as noted in
Marx's poem "The Player" in the last chapter, and Burke's
"identification" and the psychological ramifications of both
for Marx, personally, carry forward into our rhetorical

examination of Marx's non-fiction prose, specifically "On the
Jewish Question," adding other dimensions to our
comprehension of the essay and its motivation.
The darker side of "play" can be found in anti-Semitic

literature.

In "The Passion of the Anti-Semite" (1948),

Jean-Paul Sartre discusses just this point.

Anti-Semites have the right to play. They even like
to play with discourse for by giving ridiculous
reasons, they discredit the seriousness of their
interlocutors. They delight in acting in bad faith,
since they seek not to persuade by sound argument but
to intimidate and disconcert. (148)

Sartre,

philosopher, political essayist and activist,

argues that anti-Semitism is not an idea but a passion, pne
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which he equates with hysteria.

He says that historically

the hatred of Jews has not been based upon "an 'historical

fact' but the idea that the agents of history formed for
themselves of the Jew" (146).

In refuting the view that

"social facts" indicate that, for example, there are too many
Jewish lawyers, Sartre says that one doesn't hear a like
complaint that there are "too many Norman lawyers"
there are too many Breton doctors.

or that

His point is that

"Normans are [considered] Normans and Jews as Jews" (147).
It is, he continues, "the idea of the Jew which seems to be

the essential thing" [Sartre's emphases](147). Lest we
confuse the passion of anti-Semitism with the passions of

hatred and anger, Sartre cautions that hate and anger must
have a provocation; someone must instigate the anger/hatred.
Anti-Semitism, on the other hand, "precedes the facts that

are supposed to call it forth" (147).

He reasons that it is

not unusual for people to prefer passion to reason; usually

they love the objects of passion but as the anti-Semite
chooses hate it must be the state of passion that he loves.

Marx is certainly a man of passion,

we have seen it

demonstrated in his poem "The Player" (see above, page 23).
Anti-Semitism is prevalent throughout "On the Jewish
Question," and we see his violent hatred directed at Lassalle
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(see above, page 18).

We also learned of the historical

circumstances that shaped his world, McLellan's and Kamenka's

assessments attest to Marx's equivocal status in society (see

above, page 20) and Saenger an Oilman confirm his deep Jewish

self-hatred (see above, pages 24-26).
also reveal a man of reason.

Yet Marx's writings

Like the man, they are greater

than the sum of the parts.

Classically educated from the local gymnasium through
five years at the University of Berlin, he had developed his
ability to use language to manipulate audiences in both the
classical and modern sense. Marx's doctoral dissertation,
entitled "The Difference Between the Democritean and

Epicurean Philosophies of Nature" (1839-41), voiced his
"Promethean revolt."

"By liberating the world from the

unphilosophical condition, men at the same time liberate
themselves from philosophy, which in the form of a definite

system has held them in fetters" (qtd. in Lewis 33).

This

passage demonstrates Marx's use of the classical figure,

polyptoton, the use of a repeated word or root in different
grammatical functions, i.e. liberating, liberate.

Arthur

Quinn points out in Figures of Speech, it is a technique used
frequently in aphorisms as in Epicurus', "Nothing is enough
to the man for whom enough is too little."

Quinn suggests

that it is successful because it is not readily recognizable
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as a figure and therefore makes the adage seem "strikingly

original" (74). (It is not surprising that Marx uses
polyptoton/ a technique favored by Epicurus--whose philosophy
was the focus of Marx's dissertation.)

Such rhetoric would

serve Marx well.

while Marx relied heavily upon rhetorical strategies, he

touted the dialectic--with, of course, his own modifications.
The word "dialectic" has accrued many meanings over the
centuries so it is worthwhile, here, to slow our argument to
discuss the different conceptions.

Originally, the

Aristotelean dialectic and that of the classical Greek

scholars, "us[ed] rigorous syllogistic logic to approach

probable truths in questions about human affairs and
philosophy that do hot?lend themselves to absolute certainty"
(Bizzell and Herzberg 4). In modern usage, the dialectic has

become a "philosophical Concept of evolution applied to
diverse fields including thought, nature, and history"

("Dialectic," Brit. 63).

When applied philosophically by

Kant, the dialectic shows "the mutually contradictory
character of the principles of science, when they are
employed to determine objects beyond the limits of experience
(i.e. the soul, the world, God)" (OED, "Dialectic" 599).
Between these two definitions rests the Hegelian dialectic:

"The tendency of a notion to pass over into its own negation
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as the result of conflict between its inherent contradictory

aspects" ("Dialectic^" Brit. 63). Hegel denied Kant's
position that the contradictions of science were
irreconcilable.

Instead he maintained that the term

"dialectic" applies:
(a) to the process of thought by which such
contradictions are seen to merge themselves In a
higher truth that comprehends them; and (b) to the
world-process on its objective side, develops
similarly by a continuous unification of opposites.
(OED "Dialectic" 599)

Marx adopted Hegel's definition but revised it through
the application of Ludwig Feuerbach's "'transformational
criticism...inverting its principle propositions" (Tucker

xxii).H

Instead of the Hegelian belief that the course of

events could be deduced from any "principle of dialectics,"
Marx said that the principles must be inferred from the
events, matter over mind.

This gave rise to the Marxian

theory of dialectical materialism, according to whidh
political events or social phenomena are to be
interpreted as a conflict of social forces (the "class

struggle") produced by the operation of economic
causes, and history Is to be interpreted as a series
of contradictioris and their solutidfls (the thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis of Hegelian philosophy).
(OED, "Dialectical," 600)
Marx's collaborator, Friedrich Engels, described this
dialectical process as the being like the planting of a
cereal seed (thesis), which is annihilated as the plant grows

(antithesis) and, in developing, a causes its own extinction
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in the production of new seeds (synthesis).

Marx considered

this to be the universal law of nature, history and thought.
The fundamental change between Hegel's and Marx's view
of the dialectical process is one from "spirit" (Hegel) to
"material" (Marx).

Marx relished "turning Hegel on his head."

In "A

Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" Marx takes
Hegel's view, that civil society was an outgrowth of the
state, and says instead that the state was an outgrowth of

civil society. In referring to the Hegelian dialectic in the

Afterword of the second German edition of Capital, Marx says,
"With him it is standing on its head.

It must be turned

right side up again, if you would discover the rational

kernel within the mystical shell." (Tucker, Intro. The MarxEngels Readerfxx-xxi).

in Stanley Fish's highly specialized view,

he describes

the dialectic presentation as

disturbing, for it requires of its readers a searching
and rigorous scrutiny of everything they believe in
and live by. it is didactic in a special sense; it
does not preach the truth, but asks that its readers

discover the truth for themselves, and this discovery

is often made at the iexpertse not only of a reader's
opinions and values, but of his self-esteem.(Fish 1-2)
The intent is to force the audience into reevaluation and

change. The end product of this dialectical experience "is

(or should be) nothing less than a conversion" (Fish 2).
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The antithesis, according to Fish, is rhetoric, making
"lies and impieties attractive...indue[ing] forgetfulness and
complacency" (15). So what are we to make of Marx, who mixes

his rhetorical and dialectical presentations?
Marx attempts Fish's "conversion" by vehemently trying
to dissuade his audience from embracing religion altogether.

And while Marx is guilty of "pander[ing] to his audience's

immediate desires" (Fish 15-16), he utilizes the definitive
dialectic form to:

transform []the soul-mind into an instrument capable
of seeing things in the phenomenal world for what they
really are (turning things upside down), imperfect and
inferior reflections of a higher reality whose claim
on our thoughts and desires is validated as earthly
claims are discredited. (Fish 7)
Certainly, in its final extreme, the socialist/communist

world Marx envisioned was other-worldly, manifesting a
"higher reality," a Utopia that is not credible given man's
generally self-serving attitude.

Yet, Marx did not stop with

Hegel in "turning things upside down" to attempt to achieve
his world view.

In his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, Marx

says, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in
various ways; the point is to change it" (145).
be considered Marx's raison d'etre.

This could

Calling for "a ruthless

criticism of everything existing" in a letter to Arnold Ruge
in 1843, his writings reflect his critical and revolutionary
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attitudes directed toward social reality.

It is not too far

fetched then to postulate that in defying tradition by
inverting Hegel and blending the rhetorical approach with the
dialectic, Marx was mirroring his ideology.

Not limiting himself to the larger components of written

expression, Marx also uses inversion at the level of
sentences.

Marx poses the question "What specific social element is
it necessary to overcome in order to abolish Judaism?"

[Marx's emphasis] ("Jewish Question" 48).

He then suggests,

"Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion, but
let us seek the secret of the religion in the real Jew'*
("Question" 48).

Using antimetabole, a form of antithesis

repeated in opposite order (Quinn 93), and clearly aligning
himself with his audience against the Jews, Marx presents us
with an idea and then its inverse--an antithesis.

Antithesis

and antimetabole are more than interesting uses of language;
they allow for repetition and accumulation--two fine didactic

techniques'—by denying the contrary and asserting it (Quinn
93).

Marx uses this technique extensively in his essay to

press home his point.

Thus man was not liberated from religion; he received
religious liberty. He was not liberated from

property; he received the liberty to own property.

He

was not liberated from the egoism of business; he
received the liberty to engage in business.("Question"

■.
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Besides using antimetabole, Marx also alters the passive
voice to the active as he moves from the first clause to the

second in each sentence.

But instead Of implying that man is

the doer, Marx conditions the action by saying "he
received..." and through the repetition of the same phrase,

"he received.

emphasizes man's subjugation.

In the first section of the essay, Marx makes his case
against religion, specifically against Judaism, paraphrasing
Bruno Bauer, whose essays "The Jewish Question" and "The
Capacity of Present-Day Jews and Christians to Become Free,"

are the proximate cause for Marx's essay.
condemning Jews as egoists.

Marx begins by

"You Jews are egoists if you

demand for yourselves, as Jews, a special emancipation"

("Question" 26).

Again, Marx's aritimetabole sets the Jews

up as adversaries of the German people.

"Why should the

German be interested in the liberation of the Jew, if the Jew

is not interested in the liberation of the German" (27).
Then he stresses that the Jews set themselves apart, not only

from the German people, but Christians as well.

"The Jew

himself in this state, has the privilege of being a Jew.

As

a Jew he possesses rights which the Christians do not have"
(27).

Marx is very clever in weaving his own interpretations

through Bauer's words. He haphazardly uses quotation marks,

sometimes attributing quotes, sometimes paraphrasing,^^ This
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makes it difficult, at this juncture, to ascertain whose
words are whose.

his own

Later in the essay, however, Marx allows

no-longer-camouflaged voice to surface.

He uses

Bauer as a whipping boy for not having taken his argument far

enough.

Bauer stopped short of defaming all religion, and

did not require that society be purged of all Jews.
Marx's tone comes through in his style.
use of italics,

He makes ample

even in quoting from Bauer's essays,

and

his choice of nouns, adjectives and modifiers all emphasize
his defamatory agenda.
When we move our rhetorical investigation from the level
of sentences to that of words, we see Marx uses words to

great effect.

Some examples are: "right of property," "right

of self-interest,"
"monad,

"private interest," ''private

caprice,"

"nature,^' and any and all forms of the word "ego."

These words are used to imply oppositions between the
individual and society as a whole, distinguishing between the
general rights of man and the specific rights of the citizen.

Marx says that man's individual rights keep him from being at
one with the community of man.
But it is the word "Jew," its variations, and Marx's
repeated use of it as an epithet that is striking.
"egoists," there is "the privilege of being a Jew."
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Jews are
"'[T]he

Jew by his very nature, cannot be emancipate.' and '...his
restricted Jewish nature always finally triumphs over his

human and political obligations.'"^^
"He regards himself as a member of the Jewish people,
and the Jewish people as the chosen people." "[A] Jewish
attitude, i.e., that of a foreigner, towards the state" keeps
him forever apart.

Gordon W. Allport points out in The Nature of Prejudice
that "a noun abstracts from a concrete reality some one
feature and assembles different concrete realities only with
respect to this one feature" [Allport's emphasis] (174-75).
He uses Irving Lee's example of a blind man who may be many
other things—^a good student, careful listener, conscientious

worker'—but because he is also a blind man he is stigmatized
by that noun [Allport's emphasis]. He calls this a symbol of
"primary potency"—a label that "distracts our attention
from concrete reality.

The living, breathing, complex

individual...is lost to sight" (175-76).

Allport goes on to

say that the force of the noun's primary potency may be

mitigated if used as an adjective, e.g. Jewish artist, Negro
soldier. Catholic teacher, whereby other group
classifications are just as legitimate as the racial or
religious (176) and the more attributes used tO describe an

individual the better, suggesting that "we designate ethnic
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and religious membership wherie possible with adjectives
rather than nouns" (177).

Marx rigorously avoids the use of the word Jew/Jewish as
an adjective; he has no desire to mitigate the connotations^
One exception is "the practical Jewish spirit" (50), but he

uses another adjective, "practical," not to conciliate but to

heighten the negative impact as he has already argued that
practicality is synonymous with self-interest and

huckstering.

These are all Jewish traits and all are anti

social.

But while in the first section of his essay, there

appears to be a less specific attack on Jews and a more

general one on the condition of mankind as a whole,

in the

second portion he equates Jews and Judaism with the monad,

the egoist, and the financier to demonstrate they are one and
the same and consequently anathema to society and true human
emancipation.

Marx finally disassociates himself from Bauer's Jewish
question criticism by stating that is only a theological
criticism as in Germany "there is no political state, no
state as such...The Jew finds himself in religious opposition

to the state, which proclaims Christianity as its foundation"
(30).

When no state religion exists and when it "ceases to

maintain a theological attitude toward ireligibn," the Jewish

Question becomes one of politics and not theology (29-31).
Marx then poses the question, "What is the relation between
complete political emancipation and religion?" and sets up

the hypothetical syllogism that if a country has full
political emancipation and religion continues to exist, then
the "existence of religion is not at all opposed to the

perfection of the state, but since the existence of religion
is the existence of a defect, the source of the defect must

be sought in the nature of the state itself" ("Questioh" 31).
He thus makes the point that theological questions must be
addressed as secular ones and not the reverse.

This reflects

the Hegelian inversion discussed earlier (page 34) and also

is a technique of accumulation and an antithesis (Quinn 67).
Marx goes on to state that man, by still adhering to a
religion in the private and civil sector in a secular state,
is a "profane being" ("Question" 34).

"The democratic state,

the real state, does not need religion for its political

consummation" ("Question" 37).
Marx felt that Bauer erred in relegating religion to

individual worship; the state must abolish religion not only
from its political life but it must be abolished from the
civil or private life, as well.

Worth noting is the implicit

totalitarian position Marx takes on the subject of all
religion'.

And it can be argued that his positibn on Jews was
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hardly different than that on Christians.
"Christianity issued from Judaism.

absorbed into Judaism" (52)

Marx says that

It has now been re

But he blames Jews for their

corrupting influence. He argues that,
It was only in appearance that Christianity overcame
real Judaism. It was too refined, too spiritual to

eliminate the crudeness of practical need except by
raising it into the ethereal realm.

Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism;
Judaism is the vulgar practical application of
Christianity. ("Question 52)
Marx, nevertheless, singles but Jews and Judaism:

We do not say to the Jews, therefore/ as does Bauer:

ybu cannot be emancipated politicaliy without
emancipating yourselves completely from Judaism.
say rather: it is because you can be emancipated

We

politically, withbutrsnoUhbing Judaism completely and
absolutely, that politicai Smancipatibh itself is not
human emancipation. ("Qnestipn" 40)

What is the reason for this exblUsivity?
In the second part of his essay,

Marx quotes Bauer as

saying that it is simply a matter of the Christian "'ris[ing]
above his religion to abolish religion in general...[the Jew]
has to break not only with his Jewish nature, but also with
the process towards the consummation of his religion'"(47).
Marx contests this view by again saying that Bauer's
theological take simply relegates the question of Jewish

emancipation a matter of religion.

He chastises Bauer saying

this "demand does not follow, as he himself admits/ from the
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development of the Jewish nature" (47).
After shattering Bauer's premises (or at lea.st

manipulating them to serve his rhetorical purposes), and
supplanting them, in the first half of the argument, with his
own, Marx now builds towards his conclusion.

He contends

that Jewishness, being at the crux of Bauer's examination of

the Jews' request for political emancipation in Germany,
not solely a religion.

is

He says that Bauer is mistaken in

attempting to address the issue theologically.

But Marx

uses Bauer as support for his claim when he says:

Bauer regards the ideal and abstract essence of the
Jew—his religion—as the whole of his nature. He,
therefore, concludes rightly that 'The Jew contributes
nothing to mankind when he disregards his own limited
law,' when he renounces all his Judaism. (47)

Marx claims that Bauer's errot lies in believing that the

Jews' essence is their religion rather than their inherent
nature.

Yet here, he has used Bauer's own words as both

support and refutation.

For Marx, the foots of .Judaism are more than cultural,
more than a product of materials, they are nature.

But this runs counter to Marx's conventional argument-

dialectical materialism—whereby conditions produce the man.
If we formulated Marx's argument in

"On the Jewish

Question" as a syllogism it would look something like this:
Major Premise:

All anti-social elements must be
removed from society for it to succeed.
43'
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Minor Premise

(implied):

[The Jew's, by nature, are set apart,
anti-social.]

Conclusion:

Jews must be removed from society for
it to succeed.

While this is a startling argument in its bare-bones
formulation, Marx is careful to cloak it in layers of clever

rhetoric and convoluted phrasing.

Using the enthymeme and

its implied premise to distort perceptions, he sets up the
Jew's nature as the less defensible straw man and then

destroys it and uses genetic fallacy to attack the cause of

the Jew's belief rather than its justification.

Marx does

not offer a logical opposition but rather a rhetorical one.

Marx defies his own philosophical dictates.
faulty logic.

He uses

He relies on fallacies and rhetorical figures.

These are not the tools of a logical or prudent individual.
Yet we know Marx to be one. Why does he deviate?
If we recall Sartre's appraisal (see above, pages 29
30), "they seek hot to persuade by sound argument but to

intimidate and disconcert," a plausible answer emerges.
is in the thrall of passion.

Marx

But this only explains his

vehemence; it does not excuse it.

In an effort to dehumanize the Jew,
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Marx uses as his

premises the most hackneyed stereotypes;
"hucksters,"

Jews are

money and Mammon are the "gods of the Jew."

He

states the "nationality of the Jew" to be that of the trader
and the financier.

He invites his audience to draw

comparisons, albeit implied, between money (property) and
Jews.

Building on this false analogy, he demonstrates that

thfey are inseparable; both are responsible for man's
alienation from his natural and emancipated being.

Marx

demonstrates that the Jewish religion and the Jewish nature

are indivisible and that their nature is capitalistic.
Marx begins a telling passage with:
Let us Consider the real Jew: not the sabbath Jew,
whom Bauer considers, but the everyday Jew. [Marx's
emphases] ("Questioh" 48)

Omitting the dependent, practically parenthetical Clause
"whom Bauer considers,'' he employs the figure of repetitive
ends, epistrophe, concluding each clause with "Jew."

Why does Marx resort to stereotypes?

Because they work.

They work because people believe in them. Stereotypes lead to
prejudice.

Aristotle calls this "indignant language" and

says that

when we paint a highly colored picture of the
situation without having proved the facts of its...if
the prosecutor goes into a passion, he produces an
impression of the defendant's guilt...the hearer
infers guilt or innocence, but no proof is given, and
the inference is fallacious accordingly. (Rhetoric

Marx's passage cdntinues with the previously examined
■ ■ ■45—
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paragraph with its antimetabole (see above, page 36):

Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion,
but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real
Jew.("Question" 48)
which is then followed by:
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the

Jew?

Huckstering.

What is his worldly god?

Money.

("Question" 48)

The repeated use of identical clause beginnings, anaphora,
used here: "What is..." in this question-answer format is

deceptively childlike in its simplicity but effective in its
repetition.

These three paragraphs offer a different

rhetorical figure, yet all are a form of repetition and it is
this repetition, drumming the litany into the reader that
helps Marx make his point. The Jew is the consummate

Capitalist and thus the quintessehtial egoist.

His solution

and the attainment of human emancipation, therefore, can only
be achieved by mankind's emancipation from Judaism
("Question" 49-52),

Capitalism creates religions, but

according to Marx, only the Jews worship (or make a religion
of) capitalism.

This behavior is the problem with Jewish

liberation. He further states that:

Judaism could not create a new world.

It could only

bring the new creations and Conditions of the world

within its own sphere of activity, because jiractical
need, the spirit of which is self-interest, is always
passive, cannot expand at will, but finds itself

extended as a result of the continues development of
society. ("Question" 51)
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Marx makes an obvious, though implied comparison between

Judaism and parasitism, emphasizing greed and selfishness.

These were commonly held beliefs in 19th century Europe and
it was not beneath Marx to use ad populum fallacy to
sidetrack his audience, appealing to favored ideas, values,

or symbols as a means of winning assent to a claim without

confronting substantive issues.

But, in this case, as he

had already supplied the premise—that the Jew's belief was
caused by greed—-it makes the argument doubly specious.
Marx'siheavy reliance upon informal fallacies would be

considered illogical and unethical. Rhetorically, however,
these means work to justify his ends.

As Socrates tells

Phaedrus, "he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his

attention upon probability.

A speaker must always aim at

probability, paying no attention to truth" (qtd. in Bizzell
139).

Additionally, Marx uses what Aristotle called

enthymemes and"non-essentials," personal appeals arousing
prejudice, pity and anger (Bizzell 151).
Moving to the language of modern rhetoric, Marx also
utilizes Burke's identification (see above, page 28):

"anything that anyone does—^verbally or non-verbally,

consciously or unconsciously, for persuasion (the old
rhetoric) or for identification (the new rhetoric)...[as] a
rhetorical strategy" (Burke 59).
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Marx exploits this principle by placing himself clearly
on the side of the "non-Jews" while encouraging his audience
likewise to join him.

Yet, Who was Marx's audience?

A member of the Young Hegelians, and the Doktor Klub,^^
Marx was one of a group of "critical young thinkers, who
poured contempt on the church, on the bourgeoisie and even on

the state" (Lewis 23). Chosen to edit the Rhenish Gazette
(1842) by its founders, Cologne merchants and bankers, Marx
moved to Cologne,

When the journal was censored and

suppressed in early 1843, Marx "retired" briefly, and in
November moved to Paris. It was about this time he wrote "On

the Jewish Question."

Also, with the financial backing of

Arnold Huge he became co-editor of The German-French Yearbook
(November, 1843).

This was yet another in a series of

"journalistic enterprises undertaken by German radicals in
the 1830s and i840s" (Gilman 192). The the backers, writers
and readership were Jewish.

As they had difficulty

publishing their work in Germany, and were denied access to
the politics there, they wrote and published in France. As
radical idealists striving for identification the primarily
Jewish, Young Hegelians wrote for their non-Jewish countrymen
only to be denied acceptance.

Their work was restricted to

those who shared their views and perceived by the rest of the
world as "Jewish and foreign"(Gilman 193).
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Adhering to revolutionary demagoguery while appealing in
part to a hoped-for Christian constituency/ Marx writes in
"On the Jewish Question" (as discussed above, see page 42),

"Christianity issued from Judaism.

It has now been re

absorbed into Judaism....Judaism is the sublime thought of

Judaism; Judaism is the vulgar practical application of
Christianity"(52).

Marx's implication is clear; Judaism's

parasitic nature could not exist, flourish, without
Christianity—the host~yet

remains fully culpable as

Christianity is only an extension of Judaism.

Furthermore,

Christianity allows Judaism to taint it with "practical need
and egoism."

As such, society has been corrupted and, in

such a state, man cannot realize his true emancipation.

The

inevitable conclusion, if we accept Marx's premises, is that

for man to become a true socialist—a species-being at one

with his fellow man--the Jew must be removed from society.
"The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of
society from Judaism" iMarx, "Question" 52)^
This final argument is the final line of Marx's essay.

Instead of the syllogism, with its supposed-to-^be-true
general premise followed by a substantiating minor premise

leading to a rigidly deduced conclusion, Marx uses the
enthymeme with a probable premise and missing minor premise
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to create a tentative conclusion.

This allows him to

expertly declare his own view to his audience rather than

guide them to "right thinking."

Marx has used a variation of

this passage four pages earlier. (We can again see evidence
of his use of repetition to emphasize his point.)
In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews
is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. (49)
The implied premise, in both cases, is that there exists an

anti-social element in the Jews that must be expunged before

mankind's emancipation can take place.

Marx also equivocates

with the word "emancipation"; in the one sense it means

liberation; sui juris, having full legal rights and capacity,
and in the other deliverance, which carries the added

connotation of riddance. It is the preposition "from" that
promotes the latter interpretation.

Similarly, Marx employs what Burke calls "spiritual

ization ... a grand device, central to polemic. Which is
forever translating back and forth between materialist and

idealist terms for motives" (Burke 76), used most effectively
here to persuade his readers that the Jews' materialistic

nature is what keeps them and, by their influence, the rest

of society from attaining the ideal emancipation.
Marx declares that the Jews are "by nature" Capitalists.
Yet if we look at his original premise in "The German
Ideoldg'y," we see that he, applying "scientific socialism,"
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states that humans originally were conscious producers only
in the sense that they produced their means of subsistence,

which at the dawri of time did not include money.

"what they

are...coincides with their production, both what they produce
and with

how they produce.

The nature of individuals thus

depends on the material conditions determining their
production" (150).

This assertion supplies support for the

contradictory claim that the Jew cannot "by nature" be

"hucksters,"

for their nature, like the rest of humanity's,

was determined prior to any need for finance.

Also, human

history when examined shows that the Jews, who antedated many
of the non-Jewish populations in Europe and whose communities
had existed long before the rise of Christianity, were,
however, isolated and relegated to ghettos in Christian
Europe because they were feared as "Christ-killers."

This

was an imposed autonomy, forced upon them, certainly not a
natural or self-elected separation.

As they were cut off

from property ownership, agriculture and "respectable"

commerce they turned to other means Of support (Sachar 25
35).

Frequently, the only acceptable "profession" was

bank^ing ancl lending, somethihg considered "unclean" by
surrounding Christian societies.

The restrictive lifestyles

and heavy taxes imposed upon them in and out of the ghetto
caused Jews to become prudent and thrifty.
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They limited

their possessions to goods they could carry due to the

frequent arrogation of their hoines and furnishings by various

regimes.

Againf this forced adaptation is not elemental

human nature but the means of Survival in a prejudiced state.
It can be argued that relying on "The German Ideology"
for support is questionable as Marx and Engels wrote it in
1845-46, several years after Marx wrote "On the Jewish

Question" (1843).

Marx may have mellowed, his rhetoric in

the earlier essay was perhaps misconstrued or, as Shlomo

Avineri suggests in "Marx and Jewish Emancipatiort," his
primary argument was the philosophical argument with Bauer.
Though Avineri admits Marx loathed Judaism, he suggests that

in

Marx's return to the subject of Jewish emancipation in

the The Holy Family.

he modified his harangue to focus on

the political aspect of Jewish emancipation (while still

adhering to the firm conviction that it is at core a question
of human emancipation).

Avineri points to Marx's support for

those Jewish writers who took issue with Bauer's contentions

that the Jewish question was a religious rather than a
political one as support for his claim that Marx had a bigger

picture in mind.

In interpreting The Holy Family and backihg

Marx, Avineri says:
It seems that Marx makes it quite explicit, that he is
concerned here not only with the inner contradictions
of an attitude which would like to deny the Jews equal
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rights in a modern society, but is out to claim those
very rights for the Jews himself. (450)

He reminds us that Marx's goal, given his "Feuerbachian,
anthropological attitude to religion"(447) and his

recognition of the limits of political emancipation, in the
essay (and by implication, that in "On the Jewish Question")
are not ultimate.

He concludes by saying that ''One has to

divorce Marx's acrimonious attack on the role Jews played"
(450).

Why?

TO better serve Marxism?

Marx may have backed off in his vehemence, as Avineri
suggests; what cannot be denied is the attack itself and
Marx's obvious anti-Semitic stance in "On the Jewish

Question."

Perhaps, having written it, Marx determined his

argument was too strident (at Engels' urging?) for his

audience and refocused it in The Holy Family.

That

investigation is beyond the scope of this paper.

However, at

the risk of being accused of using the genetic fallacy, I
have to believe that Mr. Avineri's contentions may be colored

with a certain self-serving bias,

given what I presume to be

his socialist philosophical and political agenda.
If one still chooses to overlook the obvious anti-

Semitism in Marx's "On the Jewish Question" and replace "Jew"
and "Judaism" with "Capitalist" and "Capitalism,"

it becomes

obvious that his scapegoating is directed at the materialism
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and egoism of the present society and how it is embodied not
only in Judaism but in all religion.

To ultimately rid man

of the propensity for egoism, man must be rid of all
religion; a point he expresses.

Judaism?

But then why single out

We have already ruled out racism (see above, pages

7-8); Marx knew little if anything of the biology of race.
Robert Tucker points out in a footnote to his translation of
"On the Jewish Question" that "the German word Judentum

[Judaism] had, in the language of the time, the secondary
meaning of 'commerce,'" (50) and that Marx exploited the two
senses of the word.

The Jew served Marx's purposes

rhetorically and historically as the proverbial scapegoat.

As previous investigation of the psychology of Jewish selfhatred has shown, Marx and many others chose to deny their

heritage as an act of self-preservation; this may explain, in
part, his use of fallacious ad-hominum arguments directed
against Jews.

Another explanation for Marx's less-than-well-reaSoned
argument may be supplied by Sartre who sees the rational man
as one who "gropes for the truth" ("Passion" 148).

This type

of individual realizes the provisional nature of his own
reasoning. But there are also those who "are attracted to the

durability of stone" (148), those who despise change.

Such

persons have a fear of themselves and truth, subordinating
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reason and research, seeking only what has already been

found, becoming only what already was.
passion" (148).

Sartre contends,

"This is nothing but

Anti-Semites have chosen hate as a faith,

thereby devaluing words and reasons.

They

know the absurdity of their words and attacks but leave it to
their adversaries, who, through their belief in words, are
compelled to use them responsibly.
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CHAPTER THREE

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Proper words in proper places, make the
true definition of a style.
Jonathan Swift

Without knowing the force of words, it is
impossible to know men.
Confucius

To understand more fully Marx's essay, we must unite our
understanding of the circumstances of his life and culture to
the words he uses and the way he chooses to use them. To
accomplish this I have chosen to employ two divisions of

discourse analysis; stylistics and pragmatics.
Discourse analysis is, as Teun van Dijk states, "both an
old and new discipline" (1). Whereas linguistics arose from
the grammatica and its "normative rules of correct language
use" (1), discourse analysis stemmed from rhetorica, sharing

rhetoric's concern for persuasive effectiveriess.

In today's

world, however, it is:
used to describe activities at the intersection of

disciplines as diverse as sociolinguistics, psycho
linguistics, philosophical linguistics and compute
tional linguistics.'' (Piefhce, Brown and Yule viii)
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Some see this overlap as ari aid to rhetorical analysis in
that these disciplines utilize examinations that are
generally viewed, relative to the analyses practiced by the

humanities, as more "scientific."

Its real strength lies in

allowing microanalysis of areas of textual use heretofore

interpreted solely by rhetorical modes and by the figures of
speech.

Stylistics

In the past, rhetorical analysis of literature has dealt
with authorial intent and examination of works utilizing
figures of speech such as anaphora, ellipsis, metonymy,
synecdoche, and, as we have already seen, Marx's favorite,

antimetabole.

These figures are all well and good and

analysis of their use helps literary critics to wade through
texts interpreting and extrapolating.
missing from their analysis.

But there is something

While critics could rely upon

their "good instincts" and cite similar and/or prior Use of

forms to explain rhetorical style and its power to persuade,
what lay behind or within the persuasive tools?

Arthur

Quinn, in Figures of Speech, states that "Writing is a matter
of making linguistic choices, and reading depends upon underStanding the linguistic choices made by someone else" (5).
An overlap exists between rhetoric and linguistics which
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plays out in our discussion of "figures" and discourse
analysis.

As has been demonstrated, Marx's rhetorical skill

is formidable; his power to persuade, compelling.

What I

wanted to analyze and hopefully understand was how he
achieves this impact stylistically.
Much of the early part of Marx's essay is taken up by

direct quotes from Bruno Bauer's essays, "The Jew"ish

Question" and "The Capacity of Present-Day Jews and
Christians to Become Free," as well as paraphrases of Bauer's

writings and others', notably Hegel and Alexander Hamilton.
I have chosen not to analyze these portions.

While they,

too, are indicative of, from both a rhetorical and linguistic
standpoint, Marx's stylistics, I choose instead to examine

the writing which was strictly his.
There is a climactic build in many of his passages,

frequently prefaced by seemingly rhetorical questions as well
as a liberal use of italics supplied by Marx.

For instance:

Or do the Jews want to be placed on a footing of
equality with the Christian subjects? If they
recognize the Christian state as legally established
they also recognize the regime of general enslavement,
why should their particular yoke be irksome when they
accept the general yoke? Why should the German be
interested in the liberation of the Jew, if the Jew is
not interested in the liberation of the German?

("Question" 26-27)
Echoing the technique of classical rhetoric known as erotema

in Greek, the two concluding rhetorical questions are used as
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no answers are expected and only one answer can reasonably be

made for either.

"Writers who use a rhetorical question save

themselves the trouble of offering further evidence to

support their claims" (Barnet and Bedau 78).

In the first,

the obvious answer is that Jews should not find a

"particular" yoke irksome. And the second, relying on a
forced hypothesis—that the Jew is not interested in the

liberation of the German--pushes the reader to conclude that
on this basis, the German should not be concerned with the
Jew's liberation.

As we saw in the rhetorical analysis chapter, Marx
relies on antimetabole here, reversing the structural order
of the sentence and negating the Jew's interest in the final
question.

Both the principles of end-focus and climax are

used to present the new information Marx wanted to convey as
well as create a dramatic effect, while disenffanchising Jews
from Germans. The italicized "Gh^^istian" set up an opposition
with the non-italicized "Jew."

Finally, his questions

following the antecedent, "If they recognize the Christian
state as legally established..." are more like the "then"

consequences of a conditional hypothetical syllogism than

pure rhetorical questions, further forcing the hypothesis.
Marx's use of cohesive devices such as juxtaposition.
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expressive repetition, and various forms of croSs-reference

abound.

In arguing the rights of the citizen as distinct

from the rights of man as put forth in the "Declaration of

the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,"^®

he employs them to

act as synonyms and add emotive heightening.
Feudal society was dissolved into its basic element,
man; but into egoistic man who was its real
foundation. ("Question" 45)

Man, here, becomes Synonymptjs with egoistic man, a cross-

reference.

He italicizes man and egoistic, the technique of

segmentation, to further emphasize his point. In the next

sentence he repeats the word man, carrying with it this new
connotation:

Man in this aspect, the member of civil society, is
not the foundation and presupposition of the
political State. He is recdgnized as Such in the
rights of man. ("Question" 45)

Two pages previously in his essay, Marx has alleged that
"...the political liberators reduce citizenship, the
political community, to a mere means for preserving these
so-called rights of man" (43).

He is employing the principle

of climax—building toward something.

The words man and

political are again repeated, but we recognize them now with

their negative connotations intact. Furthermore, the repeated

italics not only heighten emotion but act pedagogically, as
seen in the rhetorical analysis, to inculcate the reader with
his, Marx's, position.
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In the next paragraph Marx supplies a new definition of
man's liberty.

But liberty of egoistic man, and the recognition of

this liberty, is rather the recognition of the
frenzied movement of the cultural and material
elements which form the content of his

life.("Question" 45)

He violates the principle of end-focus in the following
paragraph, below, by placing the new information first,
stating, "Thus man was not liberated from religion...." and,
having redefined liberty, he can now equivocate.

And as we

saw in the rhetorical examination, where he exploits the
repetitive figures antimetabole and antithesis (see above,

page 36), we see here that he ignores the linguistic

principle of reduction, repeating the words "he received" and
"liberty" with variations thereof.

The repetition serves to

persuade and convince rather than dull the senses through
redundancy.

Thus man was not liberated from religion; he received
religious liberty. He was not liberated from
property; he received the liberty to own property. He
was not liberated from the egoism of business; he
received the liberty to engage in business.("Question"
45)

Though abandoning end-focus with respect to the sentence

embedded in the paragraph, he uses the paragraph itself as

the end-focus of his argument, demonstrating that man is a
passive recipient, "a bourgeois," rather than an active agent
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or citizen of the state.

Despite apparent divergences, we should not lose sight

of the fact that the crux of Marx's argument is still
supported by anti-Jewish premises.

Marx begins "On the Jewish Question":
The German Jews seek emancipation. What kind of
emancipation do they want? Civic, political
emancipation. (26)
The first sentence ends with the word "emancipation." It is
repeated in the second graphic unit—a question, and again in
the third graphic unit (a graphological sentence but not a

syntactic one; devoid of both subject and verb), where it
again receives end-focus.

The information Marx presents in

the first sentence is a given:

emancipation.

that German Jews seek

In the second sentence he poses a question

only to be answered with the ostensibly new information that
they want civic and political emancipation.

But he does not

even bother with the coordinating conjunction "and" between

"civic, political—also a rhetorical figure called
asyndeton, which Arthur Quinn Suggests promotes brevity and

organic unity (7-8)—-making it all the more emphatic
syntactically.

Furthermore, beginning the essay with these

short simple sentences, he sets up his entire argument in

this half of the essay while delivering a combination punch

with an italicized climactic ending.
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Italics, as Geoffrey

Leech and Michael Short note, are a "special device used

expressively to give the flavour of spoken emphasis" (213).
The use of simple sentences, coming at the beginning of the
essay coupled with the end-focus and climax principles within
the first paragraph, imparts a forceful manner.

The pronoun

substitution—"they" for "German Jews"--and abrupt

punctuation in the example above

both convey an emphatic

Style that would not be prevalent if the sequencing and
segmentation had been rearranged.
Marx uses a variation of the same style seen above in
the following passage:
The most stubborn form of the opposition between Jew
and Christian is the rellgipus opposition* How is an

opposition resolved?

By making it impossible.

how is religious opposition made impossible?
abolishing religion. ("Question" 29)

And

By

Again he uses the question/answer format, and with the use of

iconicity--the imitation principle—he not only implies that
the cause, religion, precedes the effect, opposition,

he

also presents a hypothetical syllogism which is apparently

"valid" and thus an ostensibly irrefutable argument.
Nonetheless, the premises Marx uses are not only questionable

but force the hypothesis; hence the argument is not sound.
Other cohesive devices frequently employed by Marx in
his essay are cross-references and linkages. Moreover, his

blatant use of juxtaposition, deictics, substitution, formal
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repetition, 'elegant' variation, coordinating conjunctions

and linking adverbials

all point to a not-to-well-hidden

agenda:

Judaism has been preserved, not in spite of history,
but by history.

It is from its own entrails that civil society
ceaselessly engenders the Jew.

What was, in itself, the basis of the Jewish religion?
Practical need, egoism.

The monotheism of the Jews is, therefore, in reality,
a polytheism of the numerous needs of man, a
polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of
divine regulation. Practical need, egoism, is the
principle of civil society, and is revealed as such
in its pure form as soon as civil society has fully
engendered the political state. The god of practical
need and

self-interest is money.

Money is the god of Israel, beside which no other god
may exist. Money abases all the gods of mankind and
changes them into commodities. Money is the universal
and self-sufficient value of all things. It has,
therefore, deprived the whole world, both the human
world and nature, of their own proper value. Money is
the alienated essence of man's work and existence;
this essence dominates him and he worships it.
The god of the Jews has been secularized and has
become the god of this world. The bill of exchange is
the real god of the Jew. His god is only an illusory

bill of exchange.("Question" 50)
In these examples, Marx again combines the simple sentences

with the complex, presenting seemingly rhetorical questions
which he then answers.

He breaks the sentences into

paragraphs lending further emphasis to them.
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Besides the

italicized words, which Marx has endeavored to represent as
similar if not synonymous in the reader's mind, it is his
juxtaposition of ideas and words, evoking connections between
two otherwise unconnected elements, however, which is

striking in this passage.

In the sentence, "It is from its

own entrails that civil society ceaselessly engenders the

Jew," he is sayihgf that civil society gives birth to Jews
through its bowels, thereby implying that the Jew is not only
spawned in an unclean manner but is also synonymous with

excrement,

in the fifth paragraph begihhittg"Money is the

god..." Marx equates "money" with the "god of Israel," (which

is already an elegant variation for the god of the Jews).

He

then defines money's negative connotations, eschewing the use
of

"it" for the time being,

instead, he begins each of the

next three sentences with "Money," then Uses the definite
cross-reference "It" to link Jewishness to the now scorned

"money."

Then, with the linking adverbial "therefore," he

implies that money/Jews are responsible

for "depriving the

whole world...of their own proper value."

In the final

sentence, again reverting to the use of "Money" as the

initial word, he concludes with a powerful, climactic ending.
Earlier in this series of examples Marx says,

"...a

polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of divine
regulation."

Marx is knowledgeable of the Talmud and the
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Bible.

He refers here to an orthodox Jewish injunction that

one should give thanks for all God's graces, including the
ability to continue in good health and disposition through
natural elimination.

He uses what can only be construed as

insider knowledge to ridicule and demean Jews and Jewish
practices.

He employs the device again when he says,

That which is contained in an abstract form in the

Jewish religion-^contempt for theory, for art, for
history, and for man as an end in hiniself--is the
real, conscious standpoint and the virtue of the man
of money. Even the species^relation itself, the
relation between man and woman, becomes an object Of
commerce. Woman is bartered away. ("Question" 51)

The reference this time, "an object Of commerce," is to the
ketubba, or marriage contract, in which men agree to pay a
settlement of a specified amount Of money to their wife or

her family in the event the marriage results in divorce.

Combining end-focus in each of the sentences:

"man of

money," "object of coinmerce," "bartered away" with the
hypothetical syllogism; where if A then B, if B then C,
therefore, if A then C, Marx uses the principle of climax to

coerce the reader into concluding that the Jew, who has no
real redeeming social value as he is contemptuous of

everything artistic and creative in mankind except money,
is--in the name of money—even willing to sell his wife.

Besides divulging his ihtimate knowledge of Jewish
tradition,

Marx's use of "Even" at the beginning of the
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second sentence as an adverbial link that signals something

of even greater contrast will be forthcoming, persuades the
reader to believe that what follows is not only negative but
reprehensible.

His deictic use of "that" to begin the

sentence is used in a reductive sense to refer first, to the

"contempt for theory, etc."

and second, and perhaps more

importantly, to reduce through a condescending tone that
which is abhorrent, e.g., "That one—the one who did all the
damage."

Throughout the essay, Marx weaves into his argument ad
hominem attacks upon the Jews.

As was pointed out earlier in

the examinations of rhetorical figures, these occurrences
become more frequent and virulent in the second half of the
paper:

Let us consider the real Jew:

not the sabbath Jew,

Whom Bauer considers, but the everyday Jew.
Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion,
but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real
Jew.

What is the profane basis of Judaism?

Practical

need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the
Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.
Very well: then in emancipating itself from
huckstering and money, and thus from real and
practical Judaism, our age would emancipate itself.
An organization of society which would abolish the
preconditions and thus the very possibility of
huckstering, would make the Jew impossible.
("Question" 48)
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Relying on anaphora (repetition of beginnings: "Let us...")/
antimetabole (repetition in opposite order which is also a
negation: "Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his

religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion in the

real Jew") and epistrophe (repetition of endings: "Let us
consider the real Jew:

not the sabbath Jew, whom Bauer

considers, but the everyday Jew") in their respective
paragraphs, Marx is able to shift the focus to the end of the

passage while repeating "Jew" again and again.
Marx does not want the reader to focus on the "sabbath

Jew;" implying the religiously correct individual;

he wants

the attention focused on the "everyday Jew," one devoid of

religion and God.

He knows his audience; if not primarily

Christian, they at least share his predisposition to dislike
and distrust Jews.

He underscores all this by placing

"everyday Jew" at the end of the sentence and paragraph so it
receives end-focus.

In the third paragraph he asks three questions and then
supplies the answers as a single graphic unit minus the

subject and verb;
"Huckstering";

"Practical need, self-interest";

"Money."

This is the figure ellipsis—a

stylistic device whereby certain parts of a sentence are
omitted.

In the first assertion: the basis of Judaism is

"practical need, self-interest," the conjunction is omitted,
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another example of asyndeton (as on page 62).

These

omissions serve to move the reader along, speed things up.
They don't allow one to dwell or reflect.

And once again the

end-focus principle makes his point emphatic.

By italicizing

the words practical need, self-interest, huckstering and
money, a device called segmentation, Marx suggests emphasis
and intonation.

The Jews' cult is "huckstering"; an

outgrowth of practical need.

Their worldly god is "[m]oney";

the product of the huckstering. Here, Marx uses a crescendo-

like technique, the principle of climax, to substantiate the
claim.

Haying achieved metonymic substitutions--the reader now
reads "money" and/or "huckster" for Jew/Judaism and vice

versa—Marx builds upon this groundwork to state in the

fourth and fifth paragraphs that to emancipate itself the
"age" must emancipate itself from money and consequently,
Jews.

Venturing further, he says that the society freed from

the conditions which make huckstering possible would make

Jews impossible. But Marx's inductive argument implies that
"practical need and huckstering" are synonymous with Judaism.
This then raises the question, does Marx propose to get
rid of the hucksters/Jew.

And, if so, is it possible to get

rid of Jews without physical annihilation?
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This is the

Jewish Question.

Though is a cleverly constructed, linked argument, it is

unsound.

Were his premises truthful, which again, as was the

case in the previous argument (see above, page 63), they are
not, it would not only be valid but sound.
Marx commits at least six fallacies;

(1) Ad hominem; arguing against a claim

by attacking

the holder in irrelevant ways--the cult of the Jews
is huckstering;
(2) The genetic fallacy: attacking the cause of

someone's belief rather than its justification

Judaism's basis is practical need/self-interest;
(3) Equivocation: a fallacy that turns on the
semantics of words—Jews/Judaism are equivalent to
self-interestf huckstering, money;
(4) Hasty generalizations: a conclusion drawn about an
entire population based on too small a sample-—all
Jews are this way;
(5) The straw man: in attacking an opponent's position
one attacks a less defensible similar but different

position—because some Jews are creditors, they are
self-serving usurers;
(6) The fallacy of the negative proof: whereby someone
argues that because we don't know if a certain
statement is true, then it is false or because we have
no proof that it is false, then it is true—the

abolition of money and moneylending would make
Judaism/Jews disappear.

These same techniques are apparent again in the example
below.

Here, Marx casts aspersions on Christianity, as a

perfected off-shoot of Judaism, for alienating man from
himself and nature.

The difference is that he Uses more
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complex sentences that serve to mitigate the strength of his
chastisement:

Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism;
Judaism is the vulgar practical application of
Christianity. But this practical application could
only become universal when Christianity as perfected
religion had accomplished, in a theoretical fashion,
the alienation of man from himself and from nature.

It was only then that Judaism could attain universal
domination and could turn alienated man and alienated

nature into alienable, saleable objects, in thrall to
egoistic need and huckstering. ("Question" 52)

Despite the appearance of his taking Christianity to task in

the first paragraph, he reverts to form once again, using the
backgrounding technique to highlight his climactic
foregrounding of Judaism as responsible for man's being held
in thrall to egoistic need and huckstering.

J.E. Grimes

calls this climatic foregrounding, staging or thematization.
It occurs where

[e]very clause, sentence, paragraph, episode, and
discourse is organised around a particular element
that is taken as its point of departure. It is as
though the speaker presents what he wants to say from

a particular perspective, (qtd. in BrOwn and Yule 134)
This foreground is played against a background of what

Teun A. van Dijk calls the "ASSUMED NORMALITY of the world"
(qtd. in Brown and Yule 62). We, as readers or hearers,

"recognize types of communicative events which take place
against a background of a mass of below-conscious

expectatipns...based on paat experience" (Brown and Yule 62).

71

All this allows the reader, in the case of Marx's essay, to
recognize the regularities inherent in this type of writing,
generalize from past exposure and predict the outcome or the
direction the argument will take.

Readers, then, do not need

to pay attention to all that is written; it is enough to
gloss the material to get a general idea of how it relates to

past experience and "construct...the probable detail" (F.C.
Bartlett, qtd in Brown and Yule 63).

This is also known as

presupposition, something we Will investigate further in the

pragmatics analysis.
Cultural stereotypes provide a source of corroboration
or embarrassment depending upon past experience.

If, for

instance, a certain genre of joke is told, the hearer may or
may not know how to respond based upon whether he has heard

the same kind of joke before

"get" the joke at all.

(Brown and Yule 63), or may not

By the same token, if a reader's

background knowledge allows him to make presuppositions about
what is being read without a thorough reading, he may simply
miss certain references whether implicit or direct.

For Marx's audience, already predisposed to anti-

Semitic sentiment, the anti-Christian allusion may be
overlooked or be simply mildly troubling. To persuade the
more discerning reader, Marx uses words and phrasing that
belie the new information he presents:

Christianity is the

sublime thought of Judaism; Ghristianity as perfected
religion; in a theoretical fashion.

In the following paragraphs, Marx reiterates much of

what he has said before throughout the essay.

It is this

expressive repetition which Leech and Shbrt have said is
"expressive in that it gives emphasis or emotive heightening
to the repeated meaning" (Leech and Short 247).

Repetition,

as we saw when we analyzed Marx's use of the rhetorical

figures antithesis and antimetabole (see above, page 36) is
also a frequently used didactic device to get readers to pay
attention.

In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is
the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. ("Question"
49)

The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the
nationality of the trader, and above all of the
financier. ("Question" 51)
In its perfected practice the spiritual egoism of
Ghristianity necessarily becomes the material egoism
of the Jew, celestial need is transmuted into

terrestrial need, subjectivism into self-interest.
The tenacity of the Jew is to be explained, not by his
religion, but rather by the human basis of his
religion-—^^practical need and egoism. ("Question" 52)
As soon as society succeeds in abolishing the
empirical essence of Judaism—^huckstering and its
conditions-^the Jew becomes impossible, because his
consciousness no longet has an object. The subjective
basis of Judaism--^practical need--assumes a human
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form, and the conflict between the individual,
sensuous existence of man and his species-existence,
is abolished.

The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation
of society from Judaism. ("Question" 52)
Of special interest is the fact that the first paragraph and
the last are almost verbatim.
the last line of the essay.

The final paragraph is also

If the principal of end-focus,

the principal of climax, and repetition mean anything, then
this is not only Marx's conclusion but also his focus.

If we read the first and last paragraphs alone, could
Marx be advocating genocide, albeit implicity?

He has

already constructed a powerful, though fallacious, argument

which could be construed as arguing for this interpretation.
But if we look at the fourth paragraph, where he states that

if society rids itself of the "empirical" or observable
"essence of Judaism,"

which he has already defined and does

so again as "huckstering," the Jew will become "impossible"-
cease to exist.

Does Marx mean cease to exist as a JeW/ or

as a living being?

It may be inferred that it is simply
■

!

'

■
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enough to no longer sustain an economic nexus, which will in

turn cause Jews to fade away, having removed the object of
their consciousness.

But then Marx says that the "subjective

basis of Judaism—-practical need—-assumes a human form." The

segmenting dashes place emphasis on the preceding words,

"Judaism" and "need," as they did in the foregoing sentence
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accentuating "Judaism" and "the Jews."
ambiguous.

But the phrase is

How does this transmutation take place?

implying that heretofore Jews were/are not human?
he says "assumes a human form,"

form is still living.

Is he

And when

he has not said whether this

The iwpiication is that the barrier

between man as an individual and man as a species being will
be dissolved, but the circumstances by which this will be
achieved are unclear.

It can be argued that Marx is making a materialist

argument:

Jews/Judaism are products of objective conditions.

Remove those conditions and you remove the product of those

conditions—the Jew.

As we saw above, in Chapter Two (page

43), this is the conventional Marxist argument: "conditions
produce the man."

But it is obvious that Marx chooses to

depart from his own conventional wisdom with respect to the
Jews.

It is enough that we recall Marx's clash with Bauer

over Bauer's contention that the emancipation of the Jews is

simply a theological question rather than, as Marx would have
it, a question of Jewish "nature," or review his rhetoric:

Money is the jealous god of Israel; huckster;
worshipper of Mammon; the egoist whose 'profane basis'
is 'practical need' and 'self-interest'; The

chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality
of the trader, and above all of the financier;

Jews

are 'egoists'; There is 'the privilege of being a
Jew'; '[T]he Jew by his very nature, cannot be
emancipate' and '...his restricted Jewish nature
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always finally triumphs over his human and political
obligations'; He regards himself as a member of the
Jewish people, and the Jewish people as the chosen
people; [A] Jewish attitude, i.e., that of a
foreigner, towards the state keeps him forever apart
to see that Jews and Judaism elicit something less than

logical argumentative strategies from Marx.

In light of the principle of charity, Marx may have been
using an inductive argument.

He is presenting "evidence"

hoping that his audience will make an inferential lea:p to the
conclusion:

in order for the world to exist as a better

place it must be emancipated from Jews; Jews must Simply
cease to be.

But it is an easy leap from "cease to be" to

"be eliminated" though one is passive and the other active.

Finally, focusing on the fifth arid sixth paragraphs of

the example, above, it could be and has been argued that

Marx's main argumentative thrust was not truly anti-Semitic.

If we view the bigoted remarks as merely emotiorial appeals, a
means to an end, convenient scapegoating, then the argumerit

might be considered a vilification of material wealth and

religion as a whole.

In this case, Marx has made strong

arguments throughout the essay, but he equivocates at the
end.

He leaves the reader to decide whether he is calling

mfeirely for mankind to disavow religion and money. Or Whether
he believes wholeheartedly that the Jews are the root of all
evil and should be eradicated.

■ ■ ■
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Through our investigative use of the end-focus

principle, principle of climax, segmentation, salience,
sequence, coordination and subordination and the cohesive

devices of cross-reference and linkage found in iconicity,
along with figures of speech and the rules of logic and
argument, Marx's anti-Semitism has been shown to be more than

implicit.

Not only can it be demonstrated, but his use of it

to further a new philosophy is quite evident.
Marx ignores the general endophoric cohesive devices
whereby the reader looks either forward (cataphoric relation)

or backward (anaphoric relation) in the text for
interpretation of a deictic reference.

He prefers to repeat

time and again what and who he is railing against--Judaism
and Jews.

However, he does rely on exophoric relations.

This is "where the interpretation lies outside the text, in
the context of the situation...which plays no part in textual
cohesion" (Brown and Yule 192).
This is where the historical record and Marx's

psychological profile come into play.

If we are to proceed

to a pragmatic analysis in an attempt to prove the implicit
call for genocide, we must understand not simply the words
but the behavior, beliefs and time.

rhetorical analysis is helpful,

As we have seen,

stylistics is illuminating

but alone does not serve our purpose,
do not provide sufficient evidence.

and the two together

We must understand the

discourse-as-process:

how a recipient might come to comprehend the
producer's intended message on a particular occasion,
and how the requirements of the particular
recipient(s), in definable circumstances, influence
the organisation of the producer's discourse. (Brown
and Yule 24)

Pragmatics

In his essay, "Foundation of Philosophical Pragmatics,"

Asa Kasher argues that a thorough grasp of language must not
separate the study of syntactical structures and semantical

relations from linguistic pragmatical theory. Syntax and
semantics, as we have seen from our investigation of rhetoric
and stylistics, combined with pragmatics constitute the warp

and woof of language.

To study one without the other would

leave little on the loom.

To continue the analogy, while the

underlying structure of the warp might exist, there could be
no visible pattern without the woof.
without the interwoven motif,

And, conversely,

what purpose does the

structure serve?

in any study of language, social factors come into play.

Pragmatics is specifically concerned with these social
factors.

"The ultimate goal of any pragmatical theory—-is to
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specify and explain the constitutive rules of the human
competence to use linguistic means for effecting basic
purposes" (Kasher 226, author's emphases).

More specifically, pragmatics studies

the factors that govern our choice of language in
social interaction and the effects of our choice on

others. In theory, we can say anything we like. In
practice we follow a large number of social rules
(most of them unconsciously) that constrain the way we
speak.

(Chen, "Pragmatics" 120)

The factors we will consider with respect to these social

rules are Speech Acts, Politeness, Presupposition,
Conversational Implicature and Deliberate Ambiguity.

While not breaking hew ground, the application of
pragmatic analysis to Marx's essay, as was the case with
stylistics earlier in the chapter, requires sOme adjustment
of the principles governing oral discourse and/or fiction. In
most cases, I have not edited the theorists' statements

regarding conversational discourse, judging them amendable to
written discourse; and I have made every attempt to be true
to the intent of these theorists in applying my analysis to
Marx's non-fiction prose.

Speech Acts

Speech acts are a central sub-domain of pragmatics.

Speech Act Theory originated with J. L. Austin's 1962

observations in How to Do Things with Words that while
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sentences can often be used to report states of affairS/ the
utterance of sortie sentences, such as;

I bet you two dollars it will snow today.
I christen this ship the Enterprise.

must, in some specified circumstances, be treated as the
performance of an act.

Austin described such utterances as performatives and
the specified circumstances required for their success he

outlined as a set of felicity conditions:
1.

2.

3.

4.

There must exist an accepted conventional
procedure, having a certain conventional effect,
which includes the uttering of certain words.
The particular persons and circumstances in a
given case must be appropriate for the invocation
of the particular procedure involved.
The procedure must be executed by the participants
correctly.
The procedure must be executed completely.

Austin's point is that in saying something, a speaker is

DOING something, i.e. performing a speech act.

For example

when you say:

I promise to behave

you are not merely saying it; you are also promising at the

same time. "I promise" is the performative.
Marx, opting for the conventional third person point of

view, uses the inclusive "we" and "us" when he does adopt the
use of a pronoun. In every instance of the use of "we" there
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is also the use of an explicit performative:
We ask the converse question...(30)

We do not claim that they must transcend their
religious narrowness in order to get rid of their
secular limitations. We claim that they will
transcend their religious narrowness once they have
overcome their secular limitations.

We do not turn

secular questions into theological questions; we turn
theological questions into secular ones.(31)
We criticize the religious failings of the political
state by criticizing the political state in its
secular form, disregarding its religious failings.
We express in human terms the contradiction between
the state and a particular religion, for example
Judaism, by showing the contradictions....(31-32)
The use of "we" and the concomitant performatives are used

almost exclusively in the first section of the essay and
concentrated in the area where Marx refutes Bauer.

By using

the explicit performatives, Marx emphasizes the action of the
verb. Coupled with the third person singular pronoun, though

it could also be read as an implicit "I," he forces the
readers into an acceptance of his view.

If readers are not

to offend the writer's "face", a breech of the Politeness

Principle, which will be addressed later, then they must
accede to Marx's claims.

It is in Marx's repetitive use of "we" plus the

performatives that a 1ink to rhetoric can be detected.

If we

recall Kenneth Burke's definition of rhetoric aS both

persuasion and identification (see above, page 28), the use
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of "we" functions as a persuasive strategy to encourage the
readers to identify with the writer.

By the same token, it

demonstrates to the readers that he, Marx, shares their view.
It should be remembered that performatives are not, in and of

themselves, factual.

They produce a response.

This response

is what rhetors, like Marx^ count on.

Any speech act, according to Austin, includes the
following:
(1) Locutionary Act - The act of saying. It includes
making linguistic sounds, arranging these sounds

according to grammar of a given language,
referring, and predicating.

(2) lllocutionary Act - The act of doing. By saying
"I promise..." one promises.
(3) Perlocutionary Act - The act that brings
consequences, i.e. effects the illocutionary act
has on the hearer. If I convince you and you are
convinced, then my utterance of convincing is said
to have a perlocutionary act.

Though the illocutionary force pf an utterance and its
perlocutionary effect may not coincide, as someone can be
warned against a particular course of action and may or may
not heed the warning, these three distinctions allow for the
study of the effect utterances have on the behaviour of
speaker and hearer ("Pragmatics," GEL 121).
Marx wants to ensure that the illocutionary force and

the perlocutionary effect coincide.
we extract:

We ask...(30)
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From the example above

We do not claim... We claim...(31)
We do not turn ... we turn...(31)

We criticize...(31)
We express...,(31)

Marx hedges his bets.

By using the performatives he

reinforces the perlocutionary effect; and by relying on
antimetabole, he further emphasizes his point by negation and
repetition.

J. R. Searle introduces a distinction between direct and

indirect speech acts, which depends on a recognition of the

intended perlocutionary effect of an utterance on a
particular occasion. (That is to say, the hearer infers from
the speaker not only what is said but also what is implied)^

Searle claims that we can discover the necessary and

sufficient conditions of each speech act.

By using these

conditions, one can explain why a particular act is defective

and why a speech act is "indirect."

An indirect speech act

applies or can apply to only one of the felicity conditions

while a direct speech act, applies to all the felicity
conditions for that speech act.
A subset of indirect speech acts are implicit

performatives.

In "On the Jewish Question," the explicit

performatives found in the earlier portion of the essay are
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dropped in favor of implicit Ones. Marx asksj
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the
Jew? Huckstering.
What is his worldly god? Money.
("Question" 48)

The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the
nationality of the trader and above all of the
financier. ("Question" 51)
The social emancipation of the Jew is the
emancipation of society from Judaism.("Question"52)
Here, instead, he employs implicit performatives: "We
ask...

in the questions, and "We assert," in the answers.

Marx is now confident of audience approval, and the
quotations above reflect this.

They are written as indirect

speech acts adhering only to the second felicity condition-
appropriateness to the persons and circumstances. He has

switched to a polemic form and there are distinct negative
associations to be inferred from the words "practical need,"
"self-interest," "huckstering," "money," "chimerical
nationality," "trader" and "financier."
But Speech Act Theory does not offer the discourse

analyst a way of determining how a particular set of
linguistic elements--such as those above—in a particular
context, comes to receive a particular interpreted meaning.
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Conversational Implicature
Conversational Implicature (CI) is an area of discourse
analysis that can best be expressed as "implications based on
our expectation of normal conversational conduct" (Keenan

256).

It is culture/situation dependent in contrast to

standard logical implication. Logical implication holds that
certain utterances (given the agreed bn conventional meaning
of the logical words and the utterances truth) guarantee the
truth of others. Conversational "implicature depends on how

the utterer is expected to behave with respect to

conversational maxims, and these may vary situationally and
cross-culturally" (Keenan 256).

If there is an overlap between Conversational
Implicature and Speech Acts Theory (SA) it may be found in
Austin's Perlocutionary Act: the effect the illocutionary act
has on the hearer.

If we recall Austin's example of a Perlocutionary Act,

"If I try to convince you and you are convinced, the act of
convincing is said to have a perlocutionary act," what
happens in the case where the convincing is implicit?
enthymeme:

In the

"Gabriel is an angel, therefore Gabriel is

immortal" the missing premise, "All angels are immortal" is
implied.

It is into this void, so to speak, that CI thrusts

itself, explaining the reader's or hearer's acceptance of
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what may not be apparent or even tangible* if we look again
at the syllogism we constructed for "On the Jewish Question":

Major Premise:

All anti-social elements must be
removed from society for it to succeed.

Minor Premise

(implied):

Conclusion:

[The Jew's, by nature, are set apart,
anti-social.]
Jews must be removed from society for
it to succeed.

we see that Marx has allowed CI to instill the minor premise

in the reader's mind.

Whether readers accept or not the

validity of the argument is based upon their acceptance of
the implicit minor premise and this is based on
historical/social/psychological factors.
As with indirect speech acts, implicature can get people

to do something without asking them to do it specifically.
Whereas, the direct speech act takes a performative verb or
not, as the case might be:

I order you to sit down
Sit down!

the indirect:

Won't you please sit down?

offers both a literal and an implied meaning.

Indirect

speech acts try to get someone to do something indirectly,
and both implicature and indirect speech acts try to explain

cases in which we don't say What we mean explicitly.
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H. P. Grice's Cooperative Principle states that

conversation is a cooperative venture governed by maxims of
truthfulness, relevance, informativeness, and manner, which

may be exploited for particular conversational effects.21
And, according to Grice, CI occurs when a speaker flouts a

maxim by blatantly failing to fulfill it. If the speaker is

able to fulfill the maxim and do so without violating another
maxim; is not opting out; and is not trying to mislead, yet
flouts or exploits a maxim, giving rise to a veritable

contradiction between what is stated and what is taken by the
hearer to be relevant to the conversation, conversational
implicature results.

According to Grice:

The presence of a conversational implicature must be
capable of being worked out; for even if it can in
fact be intuitively grssped/ unless the intuition is
replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if
present at all) will not count as coJ^versational
implicature; it will be conventional implicature^

(Grice 154)22
Thus when Marx writes:

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical heed,
self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew?

ifuckstering.

What is his worldly god?

Money,

("Question" 48)
he is flouting the maxim of manner.

The italicized words

are, at face value, inndcuoUS^-with the posSibre exceptioh of
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huckstering.

Yet contextualized by the preceding question,

"What is the profane basis of Judaism?" and the negative

connotations attached to the adjective "profane," the words
take on additional significance and become less than

perspicuous. This iack of clarity results in CI.
The rational approach, as in the case (or purportedly

so) with academic writing, is to be succinct, saying
precisely what you mean with the intent to argue or inform.
But this is not always interesting. For the most part, it

lacks implicature.

Creative writing tends to use more.

And

persuasive writing, such as political speech writing, and
advertising, is loaded with implicature.
Why do we use it?

As humans, we generally appreciate hard work; and
implicature involves the hearer to the extent that he or she
must work it out.

This leads to camaraderie--as we must

share the enterprise and in doing so establish a
relationship.

Implicature is unconventional and we like

unconventionality.

And it appeals to our desires to be both

secretive and not give offense.

We can use implicature to

get messages across without actually saying something

explicitly—especially in a negative case.
This is not to say that there are not problems inherent
in the use of implicature.

Indeterminacy can result in
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listener/reader confusion.

Harvey: Do you want coffee?
Jeanette: Coffee keeps me awake.

Harvey may well ask, "Well does she want coffee or not?"

Jeanette's reply also might be construed by Harvey, in one
instance, as a way for Jeanette to distance herself from him.

Jeanette has flouted Grice's maxim of quantity;

she has not

supplied sufficient information.
Suzanne:

Where's John?

I saw his bike on the lawn.

Again, what is Suzanne implying?

comment is questionable

The relevance of her

exploitation of the Cooperative

Principle's relation maxim).

Without supplying a context,

Suzanne may frustrate the very relationship that she and the
hearer hope to consolidate.

Lack of context or relevance can also be an advantage.

A writer/speaker may choose to be ambiguous deliberately.

If

an abusive husband is looking for his wife and asks her best

friend where she is and that friend replies:
There was a lot of rain downtown last night
the friend may be: (1) simply avoiding the question, (2)
implying that the husband (who works downtown) is all wet/a

real drip, or (3) giving the husband a hint that his wife
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went downtown the night before.

The implicature can only

understood, or not, in light of the circumstances. The

friend's deliberate ambiguity in answering may allow her: (1)
to save face by not directly revealing a confidence, (2) to

not directly accuse the husband, or (3) indicate she is

opting out by offering a seeming non sequitur.

The personality of a writer/speaker may be determined
by his or her use of implicature or lack of it.

If overused,

as with irony or metaphor, implicature can become tedious to
audiences.

The user runs the risk of losing the audience's

respect or may be considered insincere.

or not at all, she may be boring.

If used too little

While there is always the

chance of being misunderstood, for the most part proper usage
will result in the speaker being considered a "good
communicator."

Another example of how the flouting of the felicity
conditions and Grice's cooperative maxims results in
conversational implicature Can be seen in a "figurative

utterance" from Marx's essay.

Grice held that a figurative

utterance "implicates an open-ended disjunction of

propositions." Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber> in "On Grice's

Theory of Conversations," suggest instead that ''a figurative
utterance evokes a range of propositions, possibly
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interspersed with images" (163). Though running counter to
Grice, Wilson and Sperber's interpretation is most evident in
a passage in the second half of "On The Jewish Question."

Here Marx paraphrases Captain Hamilton as support for his
contention that the Jews/ through their acquisition of the

power of money, have corrupted Christians, instilling in them
a "practical spirit":

Thus, for example. Captain Hamilton reports that the
devout and politically free inhabitant of New England
is a kind of Laocpon who makes not the least effort to

escape from the serpents which are crushing him.
Mammon is his idol which he adores not only with his
lips but with the whole force of his body and
mind.(49)
The images Marx evokes are striking.

We see the beleaguered

Trojan priest, Laocoon, as a stand-in for the New England

inhabitants (presumably Christian), beset by snakes—the Jews
and their greed.

The snakes also bring to mind the Garden of

Eden and the serpents introduction of original sin.

Mammon

can be interpreted as material wealth. Which invokes Matthew
6:24.

"No man can serve two masters:

for either he will

hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the

one, and despise the other.

Ye cannot serve God and mammon."

Or "mammon" can understood as a reference to the demon

avarice one of the seven deadly sins. In either case, Marx

implies that this "idol" is worshipped not only in prayer but
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also in thought and deed.
Though Marx mixes metaphors, the effects of these

"figurative utterances" are to portray the pure Christian
populace as beset by the evils of Judaism yet unable or

incapable of resisting its tyranny, and this has caused them
to replace God with material wealth as an object of worship.
His point is clear.

Judaism is a corrupting influence.

Politeness

In much the same way as conversational implicature,
politeness is dependent upon the culture and situation.

Like

Austin's Felicity Conditions, which depend On both the form
of the words and that they be used under the right conditions

to successfully perform of a speech act, and Grice's maxims
for his Cooperative Principle, the rules of politeness are:
designed to get people through cooperative
transactions with a mihimal amount Of wasted effort,

or friction.

Unlike the rules of conversation, they

are to some extent mutually exclusive: different ones
are applicable in different real-world situations, and
applying the wrong one at the wrong time may cause as
much friction as not applying any. (Lakoff 88)
Robin Lakoff, in "What You Can Do with Words:

Politeness, Pragmatics, and Performatives," states the rules
of politeness as follows:
(1) Formality: Don't impose/remain alopf
(2) Hesitancy: Allow the addressee his options
(3) Equality or camaraderie: Aot a® "though you and
the addressee were equal/make him feel good.
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In (1), the hearer is accorded respect through the use of a
title or last name or the use Of technical language.

Formality assumes distance and a certain amount of power;
breeching it can lead to an assumption of rudeness.

{2)Hesitancy, can be suggested by the use of euphemisms: "I'm

going to the bathroom" instead of, "I'm going to defecate;"
hedges, cogitives and tag questions—"You like this, don't
you?" "Would you pass the butter, please?" Hesitancy is used
to ascertain the distance or closeness of the exchange

between two parties. (3)Equality or camaraderie is used to
establish solidarity; it is used primarily among equals.

If

someone uses camaraderie in a formal situation, it will give
offense and the converse is true as well.

Abiding by the rules is considered a standard, though

violations of Grice's maxims and the politeness rules occur

just as frequently and, as Lakoff is quick to point out,
those violations are not committed solely out of ignorance or

in an attempt to be rude, but can signal something else
implicit in the discourse.
Marx adheres to camaraderie in the first portion of the

essay, using the inclusive "we," as discussed earlier (pages
80-83), and by frequently quoting renowned sources such as

Gustave de Beaumont, Tocqueville, ihomas Hamilton and
Rousseau, he establishes solidarity with his well-read,
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literate audience.
breaches formality:

In the second section, Marx flagrantly
he is not averse to using language that

would normally be considered unacceptable in a formal paper:
it is from its own entrails that civil society
ceaselessly engenders the Jew. ("Question" 48)
or crudity to make his point:

The monotheism of the Jews is, therefore, in reality,
a polytheism of the numerous needs of man, a
polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of
divine regulation. (48)
Marx moves from the sublime to the base.

He uses Latin

phrases such as, helium omnium contra omnes (All-out war
against all) (35), in the first portion of the essay only to

slip into the most offensive, malediction later.

Implicit in

this idiomatic maneuver is the author's sense of security
with his audience.

Marx can comfortably make these claims

without regard to affronting readers.
Breaching hesitancy, Marx asks seemingly rhetorical
questions and then foists the answer on his reader.
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need,
self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew?
Huckstering.
What is his worldly god? Money.
Very well: then in emancipating itself from
huckstering and mOney, and thus from real and

practical Judaism, our age would emancipate
itself.("Question" 48)

This should result in an assumption, by the audience, of bad

breeding and inexcusable vulgarity, but because he uses
camaraderie initially to establish a unity of interests with
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his readers and utilizes the Jew as the "other" in contrast

to that unity/ his violations are generally overlooked or
noted and accepted as part of his argument.

Why Marx chooses to observe thS politeness strategies in

the beginning of his essay only to ignore them later is an
intriguing question.

Keeping in mind the audience for which

the essay was intended: the non-Jews of Europe and the

primarily German/ self-hating/ Jewish radicals of the 1840s/
it is possible to see that the camaraderie he fashions in the

first section with readers of his own ilk/ allows him to

flagrantly flaunt the rules of formality later on.

What is

implicit in these violations of Lakoff's rules of politeness
is the unstated idea that writer and audience share the views
as stated.

In the same excerpt above/ we see the use of

interrogatives and declaratives:
What is the profane basis of Judaism?

Practical

need/ self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the
Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.
According to Lakoff/ a question seeks information and

requires a response and a declarative requires the

addressee's belief (101).

However/ as Marx supplies the

answers to the questions he poses/ we can assume they are

asked in a rhetorical vein.

Rhetorical questions/ when taken

as true questions by the addressee/ and not signaled/ are
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annoying.

They violate Grice's quantity maxiin because they

are more than is needed (Lakoff 97).

That Marx supplies the

answers as well can also be construed as a violation of

quantity.

These violate Lakoff's second politeness rule,

hesitancy, allowing the addressee his options.

Furthermore,

in Lakoffs hierarchy of indirect speech acts, the question
may implicate a declarative or an imperative, a
declarative may implicate an imperative or another
declarative, but an imperative may implicate only
another imperative, not a question or a declarative.
In this sense the imperative is the 'strongest' of the
three speech act types, a question the weakest. (100)

Marx couples his questions with his declaratives (as all
polemicists do) in the examples above.

Lakoff points out

that by asking a question a "speaker acknowledges his

subservience, countering the amount of work the addressee is
expected to do" (101).
answers.

Marx, however, supplies his own

These declaratives require the readers to believe

what Marx is saying.

This

is to ask less of [them] in terms of measurable

intellectual or physical labor, but it is asking
something more demeaning.

To impart information that

is expected to be believed, the speaker puts himself
in a superior position to the addressee and is
presumably giving him something he needs.(101)
Is Marx intentionally insulting his readers?

Not

necessarily. One of the means to persuade is to appear

authoritative.

We saw ekriier that he used many

performatives early in the essay coupled with the inclusive
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"we."

And it was postulated that the readers, not wanting to

offend, would believe Marx's declaratives. Lakoff suggests

that performatives, while violating the rule of quantity^
lend clarity.

However, they still violate the rules of

politeness by closing off the addressee's options, telling
him

how he is to think, what he is to do, and how he is to

reply.

By implication, then, he is being ordered

around peremptorily, and not being treated as an equal
(violation of Rule 3) and being pressured as well
(violation of Rule 1).(103)
There is also a rhetorical component to his voice; he is
using a form of catachresis, by which:
a writer seems to have come close to abusing the
legitimate function of substitution. He has made a

substitution of a word which, far from having an
easily definable connection with the substitutee,
seems to have been chosen precisely because of its

inappropriateness.(Quinn 55)
By equating

"practical need, self interest" with Judaism,

using "huckstering" to define the Jew, and identifying
"money" as the Jew's god, Marx slips into the colloquial of
the street.

He deliberately flaunts the conventions for, as

rhetoricians might say, stylistic purposes—to catch the
reader's eye.
Marx remains puzzling though. He uses "we" to preface

his performatives, which the addressee does not perceive in

the same way as the first persbn singular pronoun "I."

"We"

subscribes to Rule 3, building equality and camaraderie.
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This in some way mitigates the previous politeness
transgressions.

Nevertheless, Marx seems to alternate

between the inveigler and the bully.

Part of the bullying is

found in what can be termed rudeness.

In "Linguistic Politeness" Gabriele Kasper discusses
three forms of rudeness:

1) that due to lack of affect

control, 2) strategic rudeness, and 3) ironic rudeness.
Strategic rudeness, which is Marx's leitmotif, Kasper defines

as "purposefully utilized by an actor in order to achieve a
certain goal" (210).

He suggests that, as Lakoff

demonstrated in her analysis of American Courtroom discourse:

the prosecutor is licensed to attack the defendant in
a manner incompatible with the principles of politic
conduct in ordinary conversation...[he] is endowed
with the right to mobilize resources that would be
illicit in Other types of interaction, in particular
rude attacks serving to break down the defendant's
control. In addition to exerting psychological
pressure, transgressing rules of politic conduct in
the interaction with the defendant symbolically marks
this person as having forfeited claims to public
protection. The symbolic withdrawal of social rights
does not only serve to adversely affect the
defendant's self-esteem but at least as much the

jury's assessment of the defendant's qualities as a
social member.

In this sense, the defendant is

treated as guilty before the jury has decided on their
verdict. (Kasper 210)

Kasper goes on to state that this "licensed enactment of

rudeness" reverses the sequencing rules of ordinary
conversation whereby "rudeness as display of aggressive

affect is legitimate only as reactive behaviour" (210) in
.
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response to another's preceding act of rudeness.

He holds

that strategic rudeness "is initiating and does not license
its addressee to retaliate" (210).
accurate.

I argue that this is not

The prosecutor, by already assuming the guilt of

the defendant, attempts to force the jury to view the

defendant as having already initiated the rudeness by virtue
of his having committed a crime; therefore his (the

prosecutor's) rudeness is merely retaliatory effect control.
Marx apparently uses the same strategy in his

presentation of the "case" to the "jury" (the readers).

He

presumes the defendant (the Jew) is already guilty, therefore

he must only convince the jury.
Marx's rudeness, his use of stereotypes, do "transgress

the rules of politic conduct"; they "mark the person as
having forfeited claims to public protection" and "adversely
affect the defendant's self-esteem" as well as "the

[reader's] assessment of the [Jews'] qualities as a social
member."

Nonetheless, they are, in the same sense as courtroom
drama, effective.

As we have seen, Marx vacillates between politeness, as

defined by Lakoff, and rudeness.

Based On the evidence of

his formally classical education and his writing, which
generally adheres to standard logical implications (pages 85
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87)/ we cahnbt assume that these transgressions are
inadvertent or the mistakes of a novice.

As a consummate

rhetorician, Marx alternates between formality and
camaraderie, only to disregard formality to indulge in foul
invective.

But rather than disenfranchising his readers,

this strategy keeps them intrigued.

His rudeness (going back

to our argument with Kasper) is retaliatory, motivating the
readers, by the rules of ordinary conversation, to view the
Jew as the rudeness initiator.

The readers, by Marx's clever

use of "we," are transformed into something other than simply
a passive audience.
the "we."

They identify with Marx; he and they are

The Jew, having Ostensibly initiated the

argument/fight, is now liable for the audience's revenge.

It

can be argued that Marx, by virtue of writing the essay, has

retaliated.
to do so.

But the readers have not had their opportunity

Marx exploits this sense of unfinished business.

Implicit in his incendiary remarks is the point that the jews
started all this.

Now we have the opportunity to not only

retaliate but change things permanently.
Marx's employs the explicit coupled with the implicit.

This methodology in some way reflects his anti-Semitism at
times overt, at others covert*

Like a man on unproven ice,

he treads heavily when he's sure the support is there. But
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when uncertain, he steps gingerly, attempting to maintain one
foot on solid ground.

Presupposition

In her essay, "Presupposition" in

Pragmatics and

Natural Lanauaae Understanding, Georgia Green defines

presupposition as a term which refers to "propositions whose
truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a linguistic
expression, propositidhs without which the utterance cannot
be evaluated" (71).

Geoffrey and Ross WinterOwd concur; presupposition is

knowledge taken as given.

"gap"

Like implicature, it is a form of

in the semantics of textual coherence.

Knowledge

derived from the text, though hot directly stated, is
inference. Their example is:

The twenty-five-year-old-man will marry the
octogenarian millionairess.
Part of understanding the sentence involves the

presupposition that the man and woman are single and have
consented to marricige,

Alsd/ one inference is that the man

is marrying the woman for her money.
inference another is possible:

However, based on this

that the speaker/writer of

the sentence has passed an unfavorable moral judgement on the

young man (Winterowd 2). One might also infer that the woman
bribed him to do it, in which case it could be further
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inferred that she is desperate.
Marx uses presupposition knowing that his audience is

well aware of and, in many instances, shares his
stereotypical vision of the Judaism/Jews.

That Jews are

presupposed to be beneath contempt, allows him to state with
little risk;

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the
Jew? Huckstering.
What is his worldly god? Money.
("Question" 48)
The italicized words may be understood simply by their
denotations.

But once again, as with many other words Marx

uses that we have examined, the italics signal something more
to the reader--the words' connotations, their inferences.

In this case, as in past examples (page 60), they are

negative inferences, emblematic of something despicable.
Anyone who possesses these characteristics is to be reviled.

J. L. Morgan, in "Two Types of Convention in Indirect

Speech Acts," identifies three properties of presupposition:
(1) Presupposition is semantic material which is taken for

granted, entailed or assumed and not asserted, questioned or

ordered in the sentence. It is undeniable; once presupposed,
you cannot deny it:

People wept in the streets when JFK was shot.
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Denying the presupposition-^-JFK was shot—would not be
successful:

But JFK was not shot.

(2) Nonnegatability shows that the presupposition associated
with a word or construction are constant when the clause

containing the word or construction is negated or questioned ^

That is, negating the main verb does not negate the
presupposition:

People did not weep in the street when JFK was shot.
(3)

Presuppositions cannot be denied without evident self-

contradiction (as in property 1), but they can be suspended:

My students would be lazy, if I had students.

Presuppositions are relative to an "assumed" world.

While it is generally taken for granted that the relevant
world is the real world (as presumed to be mutually known)

there are certain "world creating" verbs and constructipns
that can define other worlds as relevant for the evaluation

of presupposition-involving constructions (Green 76).
If graduate school was a drug, we'd have all O.D.'d b
now.

Suppose mail boxes could be bought; I'd buy one and
charge people money to put their letters in it.
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I dreamed that all men were tolerant of each other and

we had achieved world peace.

If, suppose and dream do not establish a new world

for the presuppositions all by themselves; it takes a world-

creating word and its complement to establish the world
defined by the propositibnal content of the complement.
The world-defining proposition does not have to be

identical to the presupposition it warrants.

It is

sufficient if the worrd-defining proposition provides a
necessary or sufficient condition for the presupposed
proposition.
Green, too, argues that presupposition cannot be solely

explained as a semantic phenomenon.

She sees it (as does

Morgan), not as "a semantic property inherent in lexical

items, but a pragmatic property of utterances in context"
(77).

While it is tempting to assume that presupposition is
something that is taken for granted the questions arise:
granted by whom? and taken for granted by whom?

Some have

said that it requires that it be mutual knowledge; both
speaker and addressee must assume it is true, and that the

speaker assumes that the addressee assumes it.
out that this is erroneous.

A sentence like:
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Green points

Sorry I'm late—my children spilled milk on me, and I

had to take the time to change my clothes.
does not require that the addressee take the presupposed

proposition fbr granted (that the speaker has children) to
consider a sentence with a presupposition to be evaluatable
as true or false.

The addressee only has to be willing to

infer that the speaker does, and that the speaker expects
that he, the addressee, can reasonably infer that the speaker
does (Green 81).

The fact that an addressee would take a presupposition
for granted and not evaluate it as true or false is the

loophole that evangelists, politicians, advertisers, lawyers
and any other form of propagandists can best exploit.

Lawyer:

Have you stopped beating your wife?

Defendant: I don't beat my wife!
Lawyer: Answer the question! Yes or no?
If the defendant answers in the affirmative, he admits to

having beaten his wife.

If he says no, he implies that he is

still beating her. In either case it is presupposed that he
has or still is beating his wife.

Generally, we do not challenge presuppositions.

Ann

Weiser, in "Deliberate Ambiguity," proposes an addendum to
Grice's Cooperative Principle--"maintain smooth flow" (726).
If this appended maxim holds, then both in the interest of

saving face and not interrupting the flow by challenging an
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assumption, a speaker may introduce new information or an
opinion as a presupposition.

If you imagine that a person using a sentence
containing presupposed and non-presupposed material is
in effect saying, "Assume that part and respond to
this part," then it becomes clear that you are not
cooperating if you respond instead to the
presupposition. (Weiser 727)

Weiser supplies the following example:
X:

Nixon's dishonesty is a threat to our personal
freedom.

Y^: Yes, I feel threatened by it, too.

Y^: Do you think it is? I'm not too worried.
Y^t Wait—you're assuming he's dishonest. I don't
agree. (727)

The third reply, Y3, is the one that would break the flow by
challenging the presupposition—that Nixon is dishonest.

In

both Y1 and Y2 the presupposition is accepted; only the
threat to personal freedom is conceded or disputed/
respectively.

In the following quotation from "On the Jewish Question"

In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews
is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism.
("Question" 49)

Marx cleverly introduces the presupposition that Jews need
emancipation.

That Marx's readers are willing to infer that

he takes the stereotypiGal view of the Jews for granted, and
Marx, himself, expects his readers to infer this allows him

to proffer it without a world-creating Word and its
complement.

By presenting the information as a

presupposition, Marx does not need to argue this point.
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If we assess the statement using J. L. Morgan's three

properties of presupposition we see:
(1) But Jews don't need emancipation.
Denying the presupposition is not successful.

(2) The emancipation of the Jews is not the
emancipation of mankind from Judaism.
Negating the main verb does not negate the presupposition.
(3) The emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation
of mankind from Judaism. But Jews don't need

emancipation.

This is a self-contradictory statement unless we use a worldcreating word and its complement:
The emancipation of the Jews would be the emancipation
of mankind from Judaism, if Jews needed emancipation.
In the final analysis it is clear that Marx's ability to

use presupposition makes readers accept this statement, and
the numerous variations on the same theme throughout the

essay# without challenge.

Mutual Knowledge

A large part of presupposition is mutual knowledge.
Gordon P. Thomas defines "mutual knowledge" as "the

knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs that a speaker or writer

and the audience knowingly have in common" (582).

He

contrasts this to "shared knowledge" which is "the
information and beliefs that are shared but may not be

believed to be shared" (582).

He points out that:
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The distihGtion is important, for the fact that I know
that you know something (a state of Mutual Knowledge)
enables me to exploit that "something" in very complex

ways. That complexity grows in part from the fact
that I know you will know that I can exploit it. The
implications of knowledge merely shared (but not known
to be shared) do not resonate in this fashion. If I
do not know you know some fact, I cannot use that
knowledge in the same way I could if I were certain
that you knew it. (Thomas 582)

The use of the Jew as a scapegoat for societal ills is a

form of mutual knowledge.

Exploitation of this mutual

knowledge allows Marx to make his case in "On the Jewish
Question" with need for little mOre than a reiteration of
these notions.

Thomas breaks down mutual knowledge into three parts:
1) Knowledge of Conventions—the shared understandings of

regularities of punctuation, spelling, words, grammar,
idioms, genres of writing (in any given language community)

on the part of writers and their audiences; 2) Knowledge Of
Language—-the audience's recognition of the writer's
intentions when a condition of relevant mutual knowledge

holds, which involves a) the audience's recognition of the
writer's intentions and b) the writer's expectation of that

recognition (a second-level expectation); and 3) World
Knowledge-- "before a writer even produces one word, her

audience already knows a good deal about what she might say.

An author uses her knowledge of what she believes that
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audience knows in order to say something 'new'" (Thomas 586
87).

A skilled writer will have a fairly accurate idea of
what she can expect her audience to know about the
world—facts, common opinions, and so forth. Included
in the "World Knowledge" is a good understanding of
what her audience already knows and believes about the
world. A skilled writer will have as her primary task
the goal of getting her audience to believe or feel
closer to the way the writer does about a certain

aspect of the world: the traditional expression of
this feeling or belief is the familiar "thesis
statement," but we alSo know that in much writing such
a feeling is often implicit. (Thomas 587)
Marx, relying on the mutual knowledge he shares with the

audience, that of the Jew as the scapegoat, and his

audiences' World Knowledge, that society could always be

changed for the better, allows him to persuade his audience
of the validity of his argument:
Major Premise:

All anti-social elements must be
removed from society for it to succeed.

Minor Premise

(implied):

[The Jew's, by nature, are set apart,
anti-social.]

Conclusion:

Jews must be removed from society for
it to succeed.

The key to Marx's, or any other writer's use of World

knowledge is Grice's Cooperative Principle.

As was discussed

before:

in situations of informative communication both

speakers and hearers act with reference to one

overriding assumption: that the speaker attempts in
all utterances to be cooperative. (Thomas 587)
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To get to the reason why Marx chooses to imply genocide

rather than overtly state it we can can begin by looking at a
similar question that Rong Ghen asks of Grice's theory of
conversational implicature and its resolution.

In

"Conversational Implicature and Poetic Metaphor," Chen
states:

Although Grice successfully accounts for how
conversational implicature come about through the
violation of the maxims, he does not explain, at least
explicitly, why the hearer prefers to violate a
particular maxim rather than to say what he means
directly. (61)
Chen proposes three motivations for the violation of

conversational maxims:

the Politeness Principle, whereby one

conveys negative opinions by the use of conversational
implicature for fear of appearing impolite;

the Self-

interest Principle, which motivates a speaker to be cautious
in what she says or how she says it to avoid undesirable

consequences to herself;

and the Expressiveness Principle,

which a speaker uses because she wants to be expressive.
Expressiveness is comprised of two aspects, according to
Chen:

First, it indicates that the speaker has strong
emotions about what she is conveying. Second, the
speaker wants to pass on her emotion and meaning to
the hearer forcefully and effectively, leaving as much
impact, psychological, aesthetic, or otherwise, as
possible on the hearer. As a result, the speaker uses
language elaborate in structure and deviant from the
norm, which might sacrifice clarity and easy
understanding as specified by Grice's Cooperative
Principle. (62-63)
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Marx is alternately polite, using conversational
implicature to convey negative opinions; Self-interested,
demonstrating cautiousness in building a strong but slow

argument so as not to immediately alienate his audience; and
expressive (per Chen's definition), using deliberately

elaborate, sometimes opaque, language to pass on his
passionate agenda.

It is his use of clarity: active voice

and declaratives, coupled with his retreats to ambiguity:
passive voice and implicit premises that seduce and provoke
the readers, leaving them with, as Chen suggests, the
psychological and aesthetic (or in this case unaesthetic)

impact of an inferred Jewish genocide.

Deliberate Ambiguity
At this juncture, it is worthwhile reviewing some of the

aspects of conversational implicature as they relate to
ambiguity in general and "On the Jewish Question,"
specifically.

Implicature is linked to politeness, according to Robin

Lakoff,

when the speaker/writer is fearful of having to pay

the consequences fqt something he says hpi itiay resort to
circumlocution.

Conversational implicature is a special case of
Politeness Rule 2 [Hesitancy: Allow the addressee his

options]; at least conventionally it qives the
addressee leeway in interpreting what is said to him.
Ill

He need not automatically realize that he has just
been told THAT, whatever undesirable thing THAT may
be.(100)

If we recall Marx's audience, his ambiguity and implicature
may be more understandable.

Marx's target audience is made

up of non-Jews, or at the least, self-hating ones.

But among

his readers there may be those Jews who are not yet fully
convinced of his argument.

So he is careful; he cannot risk

disenfranchising them at this juncture.

Politeness iS often defined by its violation of Grice'S
principle of clarity, "Be clear, unless there is some reason

not to be" in addition to the maxims of quality, quantity,
relation, manner.

Then, if clarity is not achieved, the participants in
the conversation will, by this metarule and their
concept of implicature, both be able to figure put why
the contribution was unclear, and what its translation

is. (Lakoff 99)
Lakoff states that there are "various overriding reasons

[for violations of clarity] that we can identify."
First, literature is notorious for lack of clarity,

poetry in particular, and often it seems that the more
highly regarded the work, the harder the reader has to
mediate between the printed word and its intention.
The result is that each reader, since he has to some
extent an individual gfammar by which he interprets

implicatures,'feceives his own messagie;

is not the same v^pfk;to all people.

a ■ work of art

It is this

:

process of mediation that makes reading good works of
literature an exciting intellectual exercise, and also

one of the things that distinguishes "creative"
writing from scientific, technical, or academic prose,
which attempts above all to be clear and unambiguous
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—and thereby sacrifices, perhaps necessarily, any
esthetic pleasure it might possibly impart to its
readers. (Lakoff 99)

Her description of "scientific, technical or academic prose,"
troubles me though, because some "non-creative" writers write

ambiguously, sometimes deliberately.

Marx is intentionally

ambiguous at times and quotes out of context purposely to
deceive and serve his own agenda.

In concluding his argument in part one of his essay,
Marx excerpts from J. J. Rousseau's "The Legislator," Book
II, Chapter VII of The Social Contract;
Whoever dares undertake to establish a people's

institutions must feel himself capable of changing,
as it were, human nature itself, of transforming
each individual who, in isolation, is a complete but
solitary whole, into a part of something greater than
himself, from which in a sense, he derives his life
and his being; [of changing man's nature in order to
strengthen it;] of substituting a limited and moral
existence for the physical and independent life [with
which all of us are endowed by nature]. His task, in

short, is to take from a man his own powers, and to
give him in exchange alien powers which he can only
employ with the help of other men. (qtd. in "Question"
46)
Marx is quite careful to set off the quotation, using
quotation marks (something he is not always so scrupulous
about in his quotations from Bauer).

The emphases are not

Rousseau's and the bracketed portions were deleted in Marx's
work.

With the bracketed portions intact, it is clear that

Rousseau believed there was "a human nature."

share this opinion.

Marx did not

He held that there was only human
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history;

hence, no permanent conditions confront human

beings—there is no permanent human nature.
However, also in "On the Jewish Question," Marx refers

continuously to the Jewish nature.

He says that Bauer asks

"the Jews to break with the essence of the Christian

religion, but this demand does not follow, as [Bauer] himself
admits, from the development of the Jewish nature"
("Question" 47).

Marx continues:

Bauer regards the ideal and abstract essence of the
Jew—his religion'—as the whole of his nature. He
therefore, concludes rightly that 'The Jew contributes
nothing to mankind when he disregards his own limited
law,' when he renounces all his Judaism." ("Question"
47)

The implication is that the Jew's nature is his religion and
his religion is his nature. The two are inseparable. And
there is nothing worthwhile to be found in Jews devoid of

Judaism.

From this apparently valid, although circularly

reasoned, argument, Marx proceeds to attack the "Jewish

nature" and its impact upon society.

In doing so, Marx

argues against his own argument regarding human nature—not

the hallmark of a skilled rhetor.

So why does he do so?

He

is signaling something else—an implicit strategy.
We cannot considered Marx a racist as the biology of
race was not considered until several decades after Marx

wrote "On the Jewish Question" (see above, pages 7-8). And it
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is an bversittiplifiGatibn, based on Marx's own history and

psychology/ to excuse Marx's discourse as an attempt to use

Judaism as a sign for all that is vile in capitalism.

For

his argument regarding Jews to make any sense, the implicit
premise is that the "Jewish nature" must be the exception to
mankind's lack of a human nature.

nature."

Marx's focus is on "Jewish

The word "nature" is used instead of biology or

religion with the result being an equivocation--a hedge,
based upon inference and ambiguous language.
In Marx's declarative statements:

In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is
the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. ("Question"
49)
The social emancipation of the Jew is the
emancipation of society from Judaism.{"Question" 52)
a presupposition is forced on the readers, as was previously
demonstrated (pages 106-07), and by doing so it also fosters
belief.

However, Marx's meaning of "emancipation," as was

discussed earlier in the chapter on rhetoric (page 50), is
euphemistic and unclear.

Emancipation can mean freedom,

salvation, liberation, deliverance, riddance or eradication.

The latter two definitions carry more negative associations,
though depending upon whether one uses the preposition "of"
or "from" in conjunction with the term, the same could be

said of the former four.

Keeping in mind the fact that Marx

has never missed an opportunity to supply or play upon the
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negative connotations of words, it is difficult to imagine he
has changed modus operandi here.
Nevertheless, offering Marx the benefit of the doubt, he
is still hedging.

As Lakoff points out:

Euphemism, then, seeks to give the addressee a way out
of having to face the facts as facts. It gives him (at
least conventionally, again) a different way of

looking at a potentially unviewable notion. (90)
Consequently, clarity is not served.

Looking back to Lakoff's earlier claim where she states,

if either the politeness rules or Grice's are violated
something else must be going on, we cannot help but perceive

that Marx's implicature, his avoidance of clarity, his
euphemisms, his ambiguity—-demand closer scrutiny.

We have seen that when speakers/writers flout the
respective maxims, principles, or rules, the result is
conversational implicature/rudeness.

It has been

demonstrated that Marx's writing is, at times, ambiguous.

The questions rema,in. Why?

What purpose is served?

In her essay "Deliberate Ambiguity," Ann Weiser

addresses how"a speaker might utter h sentence with two acts
in mind, willing that either one of them be taken as his or

her intent in uttering the sentence, willing that either of

two different acts of presuppositions and felicity conditions
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be taken as operative" (723-24). She calls this "deliberate
ambiguity and says that it
is used in situations where the speaker is Uncertain
as to which of two states of affairs holds for the

addressee, does not want to speak so as to presume one

or the other true, but does want the situation to

'carry forward;'23 therefore, he/she uses a sentence
that would fit either of the possible states of the
addressee and would 'carry forward' the situation in
either case. (724)
She says that the difference between the presupposition

strategy and that used in deliberate ambiguity rests on the
speaker's intent.

Though both rely on maintaining smooth

flow, presupposition is used to "sneak in" new information,
while steering the conversation away from that particular
point.

Deliberate ambiguity, by contrast, steers the

conversation toward that new information (728). For example;
Two school friends, Ryan and Dave are talking about a mutual
friend, Susan.

Ryan is interested in taking Susan to a

dance, but knows that she and Dave have had an oh-again/off
again relationship.

He doesn't want to risk offending Ryan

in the event that (a) they are either still dating or (bj she
dumped him.

available.

He does however want to know if she is

Ryan says, ''Susan's sure popular.

she's going to the dance?"

Do you think

if Dave answers that she's going

with him or someone else, Ryan has not offended hin* and he's
found out the new information he sought.

If Dave answers he

doesn't care or doesn't know, Ryan then can decide whether or
■
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not to ask her out, and he has still gained new knowledge
without annoying Dave.
In our examples from Marx:

In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is
the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. ("Question"

Ihe social emancipation of the Jew is the
emancipation of society from Judaism.{"Question" 52)
we can see in both quotations, he steers the reader toward

the new information by use of the end-focus principle and the
preceding presuppositions.
Weiser assures us that though these strategies sound
calculating and devious (and may be so) they are not

necessarily perpetrated with complete conscious awareness
(728).

This lack of full conscious awareness fits in with

our profile of Marx's Jewish self-hatred, also a less than
completely conscious act.
Weiser goes on to stipulate that deliberate ambiguity
cannot be defined by either form or situation alone as it
deals with the use of "certain types of sentences in certain
situations" (724).

The use of deliberate ambiguity is most

likely to occur in

'socially tricky' situations...those in which the
speaker has something to lose if he/she acts on the
assumption that a certain state of affairs is true and
it turns out not to be, but something to gain if that
certain state of affairs is actually true. (724)

It is hard to imagine a more potentially "socially tricky"

118

situation than advancing the idea of Jewish genocide to a

largely Jewish audience proffered by, of all people, a Jew.

There still exist disturbing facts that demand

explanation. Marx strategically avoids clarity; With respect

to Jews/Judaism, he relies heavily on the negative
connotations of words instead of the positive ones, or their
denotations; he foists presuppositions onto the reader; there

are equivocations in his euphemistic use of "emancipation,"
(which Lakoff suggests is a way of viewing the unviewable) in

conjunction with his dubious use of the prepositions "of" and
"from"; his audience and the social situation he finds

himself in require the utmost delicacy of word and deed.

All this predisposes us to conclude that Marx is being
not just ambiguous hut intentionally ambiguous.
Weiser says that "speakers can produce sentences with

two meanings in mind; intending that only one will be
conveyed but not knowing which one it will be" (729).

In

light of this statement and by applying her definition of
deliberate ambiguity,

[it] is used in situations where the speaker is
uncertain as to which of two states of affairs holds

for the addressee, does not want to speak so as to
presume one or the other true, but does want the

situation to 'carry forward;' therefore, he/she uses a
sentence that Would fit either of the possible states
of the addressee and would 'carry forward' the

situation in either case, (724)
we cannot discount a second option to the popularly held
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opinion that Marx was using Judaism as a surrogate for all
that he found repugnant in Capitalism, Marx's use of

deliberate ambiguity cloaks another more sinister agenda-
In the final analysis, the eradication of the Jews is
the deliverance of mankind from Judaism.
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CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

[I]n certain situations, reason exercises
little or no persuasive force when vying
against the combined powers of rage,

fear/ and prejudice, which together forge
innumerable hateful ways of knowing the
world that have their own internalized

systems, self-sustaining logics, and
justifications.
Richard E. Miller

Two contemporaries of Marx, Ludwig Borne and Heinrich

Heine, both converts to Christianity, reviled the Jews only
to retreat from their positions later.

Heine blamed

Christianity for leading him into "faithlessness, disloyalty
and hypocrisy," while Borne claimed he had become baptized so
that:

he could abuse Germans, as a German, for their
medievalism, lack of liberty and vicious treatment Of
the Jews until he had created the society in which
there were neither Jews nor Christians, but only free
men. (Kamenka,"Baptism" 344)
Even Engels was to recant seven years after Marx's death

proclaiming, "Anti-Semitism is the characteristic sign of a
backward civilization..." (qtd. in Kamenka, "Baptism" 348).
Marx never retreated from his position.
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Like his essay, Karl Marx was composed of many parts.
His anti-Semitism cannot be condoned but given the
circumstances of his birth and the world he found himself in,
neither should he be condemned for it.

If one can find

something laudatory in his behavior perhaps it is his
intractability.

Sartre tells us in his essay "The Passion of the AntiSemite" that the anti-Semite does not deny that the Jew is

hardworking and intelligent.

He will readily admit that he

is inferior in these regards to the Jew.

The anti-Semite

does this to demonstrate that the more virtues the Jew

possesses the more dangerous he can be.

The anti-Semite

considers himself average, mediocre and takes pleasure in
this; "he is the man of the crowd" (149).

He cannot be an

anti-Semite alone:

...a man is not necessarily humble or even modest
because he has consented to mediocrity. On the
contrary, there is a passionate pride among the
mediocre, and anti-Semitism is an attempt to give
value to mediocrity as such, to create an elite of the
ordinary. (149)

Marx strives "to create an elite of the ordinary" in his
writing, specifically in "On the Jewish Question."

It is

through his use of rhetorical persuasiveness, style and its
implicature that it is made manifest.

After all, isn't the

"common man" at the core of Marxism--the rise of the

proletariat?
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Today, 150 years later, Louise Harnby, writing about the

passage of California's Proppsition 187 and its denial of

social services to "illegal aliens," makes the point that

Californians who voted for the proposition:
should feel proud to be in excellent historical
company. Some 60 years ago. Hitler and his Nazis also
came to power in 'democratic' elections and enacted

similar restrictions to another 'alien' group:

The

Jews. And in U.S. history there are many other, more
or less gruesome, precedents, such as the segregation

of African Americans, putting Japanese Americans in
concentration camps during the war, or the earlier
laws against Chinese Americans and other immigrants
who were seen as an economic or cultural threat to the

dominating Euro-majority. ("On Propositions, Racism
and Democracy")

She goes on to say that human rights abuses are now being
cloaked in respectability by these propositions, these

official policies and "formulated in terms of arguments,
rhetoric and definitions of the social and political
situation, typically blam[e] the victims for all social
evili"

The point in combining the historical, philosophical,
psychological, rhetorical and linguistic disciplines in this
study, besides their obvious overlaps and interrelatedness,

was to suggest different approaches to analyzing and
assessing not only Marx's essay but other works, such as
those precedent-setting ones Hornby alludes to, as well.

There is a symbiosis among language, history, philosophy
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and psychology.

Linguistics and its extensions, discourse

analysis, stylistics and pragmatics, reflect these

associations.

It may be that one field is sufficient to

extract meaning from a text; we may find that rhetorical
analysis or stylistics is sufficient for our purposes. But
when, as is sometimes the case, there are limitations to the

discipline, or the critic, or the text is dense and the

underlying meaning still suspect, it may be advisable to
consult another discipline either for corroboration or for
new insight. I found this to be the case when I was

confounded by my inability to prove Marx's apparent demand

for Jewish eradication in his essay solely through the use of
stylistics and rhetorical analysis. Finally, after having
woven the rhetorical, historical, and psychological

investigations together, I ventured to examine the product
through the lens of pragmatics, in order to reveal the

inherent presupposition, implicature and inference that
called for genocide.

If there is something more to be gained from the insight
obtained in using the tools of analysis demonstrated in this

study^ it is the avoidance of giving value to the mediocrity
that Sartre cautions against and, as Harnby suggests, the
ability to astutely interpret political commentary so that we

do not irresponsibly foment social evil and human rights
abuses.
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GLOSSARY

Ad hominum: Arguing against a claim by attacking the holder
in irrelevant ways.
Ad ignorantiam:

Whereby someone fallaciously argues that

because we don't know if a certain statement is true

then it is false or because we have no proof that it is
false, then it is true.

Anaphora: Repetition of beginhings (Rhetorical Figures).
endophoric relationship whereby the meaning of
expressions is recovered from previous mention
(Stylistics).

an

Antimetabole: An inverse repetition at the level of words
coupled with a negation.
Antithesis:

Asyndeton:

Repetition by negation.

The omission of an expected conjunction.

Catachresis: "Apparently inappropriate substitution of one
word for another, inappropriate because there is not an
obviously definable relationship between the two" (Quinn
102).

Cataphoric: An endophoric relationship whereby the meaning
of expressions is recovered from subsequent mention.
Chronological sequencing: "textual time imitates real time:
that if A comes before B in the model of reality, then A
comes before B in the text" (Leech and Short 234).
Climax: The principle of climax dictates that "in a sequence
of interrelated tone units, the final position tends to
be the major focus of information" (Leech and Short 222
■ ■ ,125- - '

23), and "in a classically well-behaved sentence, we
shall expect the parts of the sentence to be presented
in the general order Of increasing semantic weight, in

obedience with the principle of climax" (Leech and Short
224).

Cohesion: The way in which units of language are bound
together, relying on cross-reference and linkage.
Co-operative principle: H.P. Grice's four maxims: be true,
be brief, be relevant be clear, which people assume to
be in operation when interpreting discourse.
Coordination:

"If A is subordinate to B, then A is the

circumstantial background against which B is
highlighted"

(Leech and Short 221).

Co-referential forms:

Forms which make reference to

something else for their interpretation and direct the
reader to look elsewhere than their semantic meaning for
interpretation.
Cross-reference: "The various means which language uses to to
indicate 'the same thing' is being referred to or
mentioned in different parts of the text" (Leech and
Short 244). Cross-reference allows for cohesion

(utilizing the principle of reduction) by substituting
third-person pronouns for proper nouns.

Deictic: Showing or pointing out directly by Using
demonstrative pronouns like:

this, that, those, here,

now.

Elegant variation: The use Of a synonymous or almost
synonymous expression to avert repetition.

Ellipsis: The general term for the figure of omission;
omission of clauses, phrases or words that can be
recovered from the context or from elsewhere in the

discourse.

End-focus principle: The syntactic ordering of information
in a sentence so that old precedes new.
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Endophoric:

A relationship whereby co-referential forms'

interpretation lies within the text.
kinds: anaphoric and cataphoric.
Epistrophe:

There are two

Repetition of ends.

Equivocation:

A fallacy that turns on the semantics of

words.

Ethos. An appeal to the moral sense (Sophist) and the
speaker's authority (Aristotelian).
Exophoric:
A relationship whereby co-referential forms'
interpretation lies outside the text.
Expressive repetition:

Used to emphasize or heighten

emotion.

Felicity Conditions: Specified circumstances required for
the success of performatives.

Genetic fallacy:

Attacking the cause of someone's belief

rather than its justification

Hasty generalizations: A conclusion drawn about an entire
population based on too small a Scimple.

Iconicity: The imitation principle whereby a syntactic
relationship exists between words and the objects and
events that the words signify.

Juxtaposition:

A form of cohesive linkage in which units of

language are placed side-by-side so that they are
presumed interrelated.

Linkage: The use of overt connectors such as coordinating
conjunctions, subordinating conjunctions and linking
adverbials.

Logos. Refers to the preferred Aristotelian appeal to reason
and logic in dialectal forms of argument.
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Ludic: One of Roland Barthes six principles in rhetoric.
cognate for "play," demonstrated in ironies and/or
parpdies; an opposition to work.
Pathos:

A

A persuasive appeal to emotion.

Performatives: Sentences that express the performance of an
act, e.g. I bet you it will rain today.

Pragmatics:

The study of sign/intent of the speaker

Principle of climax: "In a sequence of interrelated tone
units, the final position tends to be the major focus of
information...[with]parts of the sentence...presented in
the general order of increasing semantic weight" (Leech
and Short 224).

Principle of reduction:

Substitution of third-person

pronouns for proper nouns.

Salience: The promotion of one clause
syntactic hierarchy.

above another in

Segmentation: The use of punctuation and devices such as
dashes, italics, breaking up of lines to indicate the
rhythm of prose, suggesting emphasis and intonation.

Semantics - an analysis of expressions and their meaning; the
meaning of words.

Semiotics: The general science of signs and languages
Sequence: The placement of one clause before or after
another.

Speech acts: a central sub-domain of pragmatics.

A speech

act is an utterance defined in terms of intention and/or
effect.

Straw man:

Attacking an opponent's position by attacking a

less defensible, similar but different position.
Subordination: See Coordination.

Syntax: Sentence structure; the study of relations between
expressions.
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APPENDIX;

KARL MARX'S C0NFESSI0n24

Following is an excerpt from Laura Lafargue's, Marx's

daughter. Confessions Book with Marx's version of a Victorian
parlor game called Confessions.

It was written in English in

the mid 1860s.

Simplicity

Your favourite virtue
Your favourite virtue in a man

Strength

Your favourite virtue in a woman

Weakness

Your chief characteristic

Singleness of purpose

Your idea of
Your idea of
The vice you
The vice you

To fight

happiness
misery
excuse most
detest most

Submission

Gullibility
Servility
Martin Tupper*
Book-worming
Shakespeare, Aeschylus,

Your aversion

Favourite occupation
Favourite poet

Goethe

Favourite prose-writer

Diderot

Favourite hero

Spartacus, Kepler

Favourite heroine

Gretchen

Favourite flower
Favourite colour

Red

Favourite name

Laura, Jenny

Favourite dish

Fish

Favourite Maxim

Nihil human! a me

Favourite motto

De omnibus

alienum puto**
dubitandum***

* Victorian popular writer
** "I consider that nothing human is alien to me.
*** "You must have doubts about everything."
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ENDNOTES

1 Entitled "Die Judenfrage" and "Die Fahigkeit der
heutigen Juden und Christen fret zu werden," respectively,
these essays were published in 1843. Marx's review of and
response to them, "On the Jewish Question,"was written in

1843 but not published until the following year.

2 The emphases here and in all Marx's quotations are
supplied by Marx.

^ Harx derives his definition of species-being from
Ludwig Feuerbach who says in The Essence of Christianity (Das
Wesen des Christentums) (1841) that man differs in nature

from animals by his consciousness of self as an individual
and as a member of the human species. A fully realized
species-being is one who no longer views himself as an
individual but rather as an intrinsic part of the whole
community., . .

. .

^ Gordon Allport derived this definition from the

Thomistic moralists (as discussed by the Rev. John LaFarge,
S.J. in The Race Question and the Negro. New York: Longmans,
Green, 1945, 174ff)(The Nature of Prejudice 7)

5 Allport prefers "ethnicity" to race as this term does
not imply biologic unity. Instead, it refers to
characteristics of groups that may be, in different

proportions, physical, national, cultural linguistic,
religious, or ideological in character(Preface, The Nature of
Prejudice xii).

® Lassalle, as a socialist, first established contact
with Marx and Engels during the German revolution 1848-49.
He finally met Marx in 1861 and they continued corresponding,
though later became estranged due to differences in opinion

over the revolutionary versus evolutionary path of Socialism.
Lassalle died in a duel in 1864.
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1 Mikhail AleksandroviGh Bakunin was the chief propagator
of 19th-century anarchism, a prominent Russian revolutionary
agitator, and a prolific political writer. His quarrel with

Karl Marx split the European revolutionary movement for many
years.

® The First International, formally international Working
Men's Association, was founded in London on September 28,

1864.

It was a federation 6i workers' groups that had a

considerable influence as a unifying force for labor in
Europe during the latter part of the 19th certtury. Karl Marx,
though he had ho part in organizing the meeting, was elected
one of the 32 members of the provisional General Council and
assumed its leadership. The First International split at its
Hague Congress in 1872 over the clash between Marx's
centralized socialism and Bakunin's anarchism.

In order to

prevent the Bakunists from gaining control of the
association, the General Council, prompted by Marx, moved its

headquarters to New York City, where it lingered until it was
formally disbanded at the Philadelphia Conference in July
1876.

9 Roland Barthes definition of rhetoric was that of a
metalanguage—a discourse on discourse-—that involved the
following: 1) technique; 2) teaching; 3) science; 4) ethic;
5) social practice; and 6) ludic. For a full treatment see
Roland Barthes, "The Old Rhetoric: an aide-memoire," The
Semiotic Challenge. Trans. Richard Howard.

New York:

Hill

and Wang, 1988, 13-14.
In addition, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was a man
for whom writing was action. He is known as a proponent of

popular existentialism, a playwright, novelist, critic and
biographer. His political activism centered around a renewal
of Marxism, incorporating a flexibility to allow it to adapt
to particular situations and where the individual freedom of
man was respected.

Feuerbach's inversion of Hegel's philosophy that "man
is spirit (or God) in the process of self-alienation and
self-realization...yields the theme that religion is a
phenomenon of human self-estrangement" (Tucker xxii-xxiii).
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12 Though Fish's dialectic is highly specialized and
relies in large measure upon the classical definition, his
descriptions of its use hold in this instance for Marx.

13 The Marx^Eriaels Reader 2nd ed. 1978. According to
editor Robert Tucker, Marx uses quotation marks
indiscriminately, sdmetimes setting off paraphrases with
quotation marks.

14 Marx uses his own italics when citing another's
material, which may or may not signify the author's original
emphases.

13 Quoted from Bauer's "The Jewish Question."

13 The monad, usually referred to as a circumscribed
monad, is degenerate and has a special connotation for Marx,
antithetical to his concept of the species beings who is one
who cooperates with his fellow man, and who "has recognized
and organized his own powers {forces propres) as social
powers so that he no longer separates this social power from
himself as political power" (Marx, "Question" 46). The
monad is an egoist who sets himself apart by being the owner
of the means of production and who retains the surplus value
provided by those who labor. This concept and the idea that

the only things that exist are relations, "all being is
contingent," the only being is the relation of one thing to
another thing, are elaborated upon in the "Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844" and "The German Ideology"
(1845-46).

1^ These are the same rhetorical devices found in most
fanatical tracts. Mein Kampf contains the same stratagem and
one sees it in the speeches of Louis Farrakhan.

18 Marx became a member in the same year the Doktor Klub
was founded, 1837. The Club was made up of representatives
of the radical wing of the Hegelian school in Berlin. Bruno
Bauer, a lecturer in theology at the Berlin University, was
also an active member.

Written in 1844-45 in collaboration with Engels.

20 Preface to the French Constitution
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21 The Cooperative Principle states: Make your
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of

the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
Quantity:

It's maxims are:

Make your contribution as informative as is

required (for the current purposes of the exchange). Do not
make your contribution more informative than is required.
Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not
say that for which you lack adequate evidence. Relation: Be
relevant. Manner: Be perspicuous^ avoid obscurity of
expression, avoid ambiguity> be brief, be orderly.(qtd. in
Brown & Yule 31-32).

22 jn order for hearers to ascertain whether
conversational implicature is present, they rely on the
following data:
1. the conventional meaning of the words used, together with

the identity of any references that may be involved;
2.
3.
4.
5.

the Cooperative Principle and its maxims;
the context, linguistic or otherwise;
other items of background knowledge; and
the fact(or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling
under the previous headings are available to both
participants and both participants know or assume this to
be the case.(Grice 154-55)

23 Ann Weiser explains the phrase "carry forward" by
saying, "Often conversational participants have purposes that
can be accomplished indirectly, in conversations that are
'about' something else. But sometimes one of the purposes
may be to have the conversation be about a particular topic,
perhaps only if that topic is 'safe,' or if some other
precondition is met" (727).

24 Excerpted from David McLellan's Karl Marx: Interviews
and Recollections, p. 167 (whose source was the Moscow
Reminiscences of Marx and Engels p.266).
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